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INTRODUCTION 
As proposals for federal climate change legislation proliferate, national 
policymakers are focused on a cap-and-trade program for controlling 
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions.  I argue that successfully reducing 
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions will require reductions in energy consump-
tion, and that a trading system’s market signals will be insufficient to 
prompt the widespread transformations in land use and building efficiency 
necessary to reduce energy demand. 
Nor will federal action alone suffice.  Familiar federalism principles 
suggest why cities and regional entities present distinct institutional advan-
tages in addressing consumption given the key role of local land use and 
“green” building strategies in reducing demand.  Notwithstanding many 
cities’ active endorsement of ambitious climate change goals, most cities 
are unlikely to act solely on their own initiative.  The challenge for federal 
lawmakers is to design a vertically integrated climate change policy that 
establishes and coordinates the federal, state, and local role in reducing en-
ergy consumption. 
Given the interrelatedness of environmental, political, social, and eco-
nomic factors that are implicated in land use decisions, federal require-
ments for state and local governments to engage in land use planning to re-
duce vehicle-miles-travelled (“VMT”) must address the socioeconomic 
drivers of land use decisions.  Focusing on socioeconomic factors is war-
ranted not only as an instrumental mechanism for increasing the success of 
VMT-reducing reforms.  As state and local governments open the door to 
new metropolitan visions, they create a unique opportunity to achieve re-
gional equity. 
Part I of this Article highlights the nation’s high level of energy con-
sumption and argues that policies directed solely at tailpipes and smoke-
stacks will fail to reach climate change goals.  High emissions are a conse-
quence of high demand, and policies to reduce demand, like green building 
requirements and land use reforms that reduce VMT, will be necessary to 
reach emission reduction goals. 
Part II of this Article observes that recently proposed federal legislation 
does not sufficiently address consumption.  While many of the federal bills 
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propose market mechanisms that are likely to generate price signals that 
could incentivize less sprawling growth and greener buildings, Part II iden-
tifies numerous obstacles to generating sufficient change through the mar-
ket alone. 
Part III argues that direct local land use and green building measures can 
and should play a critical role in reducing demand.  Based on federalism 
principles, Part III provides an institutional justification for encouraging lo-
cal and regional engagement in reducing consumption.  Part III also high-
lights the ambitious climate change goals already established in hundreds 
of communities throughout the United States. 
Part IV recognizes that, notwithstanding the institutional and practical 
arguments in favor of local initiatives, significant barriers could slow their 
adoption and implementation.  Climate change presents classic collective 
action impediments.  Moreover, land use measures like infill and compact 
development provisions are likely to encounter a thicket of political and so-
cial resistance.  Some federal and state policies also impede—or create dis-
incentives for—smart growth and green building objectives. 
Part V argues that federal legislation could overcome obstacles to local 
action by adopting a vertically integrated approach.  It proposes that the 
federal government assign emission reduction obligations to the states and 
then require the states to delegate emission reduction responsibilities to the 
regional or local level.  This Article notes a number of difficult issues that 
such legislation would have to resolve, including the extent to which states 
should delegate responsibility to the local level, whether the responsibility 
should be delegated to the regional or the local level, and the extent to 
which the federal legislation should mandate program parameters or leave 
implementation to state or local discretion. 
Part VI argues that land use policy reforms will not succeed unless we 
confront the underlying social, economic, and political causes of existing 
sprawl.  Integrating socioeconomic considerations is critical not only to re-
ducing VMT, but to enlightened decisionmaking.  Principles of sustainable 
development suggest that, whenever key decisions impacting fundamental 
institutions are made, decisionmakers should integrate the critical environ-
mental, economic, and social dimensions that their reforms necessarily im-
plicate. 
I.  BEYOND SYMPTOMS:  ADDRESSING CONSUMPTION 
The politics of climate change regulation would certainly be easier if 
measures to address climate change could stop with industry.1  Given the 
 
 1. This is not to say that the politics of regulating industry are easy. 
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carbon intensity of U.S. consumption, however, the United States is 
unlikely to be able to overcome its carbon addiction without measures that 
impact how and where we live, build, and consume.2  The role of consump-
tion in causing environmental impacts is not new, but national, state, and 
local approaches to air pollution historically have centered on direct emis-
sions by regulating stationary sources and establishing automobile manu-
facturing requirements.3  The politics of addressing underlying community 
structures and individual lifestyles were simply too precarious.4  Now, 
however, the public’s increasing recognition of the global peril posed by 
climate change could shift the political landscape and increase the political 
feasibility of consumption-reducing policies. 
At almost twenty metric tons per capita of carbon dioxide per year,5 U.S. 
citizens have among the highest per capita GHG emissions in the world.6  
 
 2. See John Dernbach, Stabilizing and Then Reducing U.S. Energy Consumption:  Le-
gal and Policy Tools for Efficiency and Conservation, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10003, 10006-07 
(2007); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673 (2007) (arguing that climate change measures should facilitate the 
creation of climate-protection norms that would in turn motivate individuals to reduce their 
climate impact). 
 3. See Sudhir Chella Rajan, Climate Change Dilemma:  Technology, Social Change, or 
Both?  An Examination of Long-Term Transport Policy Choices in the United States, 34 
ENERGY POL’Y 664, 674 (2006) (observing the history of a “technocratic” technology-based 
approach to controlling automobile emissions); Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 2, 
at 1688 (observing that most pollution control efforts have focused on industrial sources). 
 4. See Dernbach, supra note 2, at 10004 (observing reluctance to regulate energy effi-
ciency and conservation due to its association with fundamental lifestyle choices and fears 
of hardship). 
 5. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Table H.1co2, World per Capita Carbon Dioxide Emis-
sions from the Consumption and Flaring of Fossil Fuels, 1980-2005 (Dec. 8, 2008), 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/tableh1co2.xls [hereinafter Carbon Emis-
sions Table] (listing 2006 U.S. carbon dioxide emissions of 19.78 metric tons per capita). 
 6. In comparison, the world average in 2006 was 4.48 metric tons of carbon dioxide 
per capita.  Id.  U.S. citizens are ultimately responsible for an even higher level of per capita 
emissions, since the per capita statistics address domestically-generated emissions, not the 
emissions associated with imported products.  The U.S. trade deficit for goods was 74.9 bil-
lion as of July 2008, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FOREIGN TRADE STATISTICS, U.S. INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES HIGHLIGHTS (2008), http://www.census.gov/ 
indicator/www/ustrade.html, revealing that U.S. consumption of imported goods is respon-
sible for production and transportation-related emissions in other nations.  A study evaluat-
ing the GHG emissions associated with goods imported into the United States from China 
concluded that, in 2003, U.S. carbon dioxide emissions would have been 6% higher if the 
United States had produced the items it imported from China, while Chinese emissions 
would have been 14% lower had it not produced goods for the U.S. market.  UNIV. CORP. 
FOR ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH, TRADE IMBALANCE SHIFTS U.S. CARBON EMISSIONS TO CHINA, 
BOOSTS GLOBAL TOTAL (2005), http://www.ucar.edu/news/releases/2005/china. shtml. 
Canada and Australia are the only other major industrialized nations with per capita emis-
sions like those of the United States.  Canada’s emissions in 2006 were 18.81 metric tons 
per capita, and Australia’s were 20.58.  The only countries with higher emissions are several 
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Other major industrialized nations in Western Europe and Asia have per 
capita emissions that hover around ten metric tons per capita of carbon di-
oxide per year,7 or about half the level of U.S. per capita emissions.  While 
country-specific factors no doubt impose constraints, these numbers sug-
gest that it is possible to reduce per capita emissions without a drastic re-
duction in the standard of living. 
To reduce per capita emissions, and particularly to reduce emissions 
from certain sectors, climate change policy must address not only direct 
emissions, but also the consumer demand that drives them.8  In other 
words, climate change policy must address causes as well as symptoms.9  
Although GHG emissions are impacted by virtually every facet of indus-
trial society, this Article focuses on the land use and building sectors be-
cause of their significant GHG contributions and the critical role of local 
governments in addressing them.10 
 
small oil-producing nations (Bahrain at 38.44 per capita, Qatar at 61.19 per capita, and 
United Arab Emirates at 35.05 per capita), as well as a number of small-island states that 
most likely experience high levels of travel (Netherlands Antilles at 49.13 per capita and 
U.S. Virgin Islands at 118.30  per capita).  Carbon Emissions Table, supra note 5. 
 7. Carbon Emissions Table, supra note 5.  Measured in metric tons, in western Europe, 
Austria’s 2005 per capita emissions were 9.55, Belgium’s were 13.10, Denmark’s were 
9.38, France’s were 6.59, Germany’s were 10.24, Greece’s were 9.67, Italy’s were 8.03, the 
Netherlands’ were 16.44, Norway’s were 11.40, Spain’s were 9.60, Sweden’s were 6.53, 
Switzerland’s were 6.13, and the United Kingdom’s were 9.55.  In Asia, Japan’s 2005 per 
capita emissions were 9.65 and South Korea’s were 10.27.  Id.  It is worth noting, in com-
parison, that China’s 2005 per capita emissions were 4.07, a fifth of those of U.S. citizens, 
and India’s were 1.07, 5% of the U.S. per capita emissions.  Id. 
 8. See JOHN HOLTZCLAW, 2004 ACEEE SUMMER STUDY ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN 
BUILDINGS, A VISION OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY 2 (2004) (“Utility energy efficiency targets, 
appliance and vehicle standards, building codes, and land use planning inducements should 
all be among the basic elements of any federal climate bill.”); Dernbach, supra note 2, at 
10006 (stating that encouraging energy efficiency and conservation addresses “the core 
problem” of consumption). 
 9. Michael Vandenbergh and Anne Steinemann observe that “[t]he framing of pollu-
tion sources exerts a powerful influence on the regulatory and social forces brought to bear 
on them.”  Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 2, at 1688.  If industry, utilities, and ve-
hicles are viewed as the “source” of emissions, then regulatory efforts focus on facility and 
vehicle emission-reduction technology or alternatives.  Id.  In contrast, if individuals them-
selves are viewed as significant emitters due to their consumption patterns, then regulatory 
strategies are more likely to focus on how to reduce consumption and increase individual 
energy efficiency, rather than focusing exclusively on large sources.  Id. 
 10. Professors Vandenbergh and Steinemann focus on individual behavior itself as a 
mechanism for reducing consumption.  See id.  Professor Dernbach similarly observes the 
important role of individual decisions in determining consumption: individuals decide how 
much to drive, how much to buy and use energy-consuming appliances, the size of their 
homes, and the degree to which they heat and cool them.  See John C. Dernbach, Overcom-
ing the Behavioral Impetus for Greater U.S. Energy Consumption, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE 
GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 15, 21-23, 25-27 (2007) [hereinafter Dernbach, Overcoming the 
Behavioral Impetus] (describing appliance use, consumption challenges in buildings, and 
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A. Land Use and Transportation 
As of 2005, transportation-related emissions contributed one-third of the 
nation’s carbon emissions.11  Over half of the transportation-related emis-
sions result from personal trips, 30% by automobiles and 27% by light 
trucks (including sports utility vehicles).12  Reducing emissions per vehicle 
is a key strategy for reducing transportation-related emissions,13 but reduc-
tions in individual vehicle emissions will not sufficiently reduce net trans-
portation emissions if Americans maintain or increase their VMT.14 
 
vehicle choices and use); see also John C. Dernbach, Harnessing Individual Behavior to 
Address Climate Change: Options for Congress, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 107 (2008) [hereinafter 
Dernbach, Harnessing Individual Behavior] (discussing the importance of policies to en-
courage reductions in individual consumption).  While their proposals insightfully recognize 
the critical role of individual consumption decisions, my focus in this article is on creating 
the infrastructure that would enable individuals to consume less, rather than on the individ-
ual choices themselves.  As Vandenbergh and Steinemann observe, existing urban infra-
structures and consumer markets do not always allow individuals to exercise climate protec-
tion norms: individuals may live too far from work or transit to easily reduce vehicle use, or 
they may not have adequate information or options to purchase energy-efficient homes or 
appliances.  Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 2, at 1716. 
 11. MARILYN A. BROWN ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., SHRINKING THE CARBON FOOTPRINT 
OF METROPOLITAN AMERICA 8 (2008). 
 12. Id. Another 20% consists of truck traffic.  The remaining transportation emission 
sources include air, rail, water, and bus transit.  Id. 
 13. Vehicle emissions of GHGs could be reduced in two ways: increasing fuel economy 
and decreasing the carbon content of automobile fuels.  See REID EWING ET AL., URBAN 
LAND INST., GROWING COOLER:  THE EVIDENCE ON URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2 (2008). 
Title I of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 increased vehicle efficiency 
standards, an increase likely to indirectly reduce carbon emissions.  See Pub. L. No. 110-
140, 121 Stat. 1492 (2007).  In 2002, California passed legislation to directly control vehicle 
GHG emissions.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5 (West 2006).  At least eleven 
other states have stated that they would adopt California’s standards, and six additional 
states have expressed interest in doing so.  See AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
FACT SHEET ON CLIMATE CHANGE EMISSION CONTROL REGULATIONS 3, http://www.arb.ca. 
gov/cc/factsheets/cc_newfs.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).  Although the EPA did not allow 
California to move forward with its standards, see Zachary Coile et al., EPA Blocks Califor-
nia Bid to Limit Greenhouse Gases from Cars, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 20, 2007, at A1, it is pos-
sible that the Obama administration would allow California’s standards to be implemented. 
Title II of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 calls for increasing the use 
of biofuels.  The potential for biofuels to reduce net GHG emissions depends upon the feed-
stock, with some biofuels predicted to reduce net GHG emissions (for example, cellulosic 
ethanol) while others are predicted to generate little if any reductions (such as corn ethanol).  
See BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FUEL ETHANOL:  BACKGROUND AND 
PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 16-17 (2007).  California has adopted a low-carbon fuel standard 
specifically intended to reduce net carbon emissions.  See Exec. Order No. s-01-07 (Jan. 18, 
2007), available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php/print-version/executive-order/5172/. 
 14. The nation’s earlier effort to control traditional air pollutants provides a case in 
point.  The 1970 Clean Air Act required automakers to reduce certain traditional pollutant 
emissions by 90%, see 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(a)(A), a requirement that was met in the early 
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VMT is heavily influenced by underlying land use patterns and transpor-
tation infrastructure.  U.S. land use patterns are characterized by low-
density sprawling development.15  With the outward expansion of low-
density suburbs and exurbs throughout the twentieth century, U.S. residents 
began to drive increasing distances as the circumference of metropolitan 
areas grew.16  The U.S. pattern of low-density residential growth has been 
heavily car-dependent, resulting in sharply increasing levels of VMT and 
associated vehicular emissions.17  From 1969 until 1990, VMT increased 
by 82% while the U.S. population increased by only 21%.18  From 1970 
until 2005, average household VMT increased from 16,400 miles to 
24,300, even though average household size fell.19 
Although concerns about the environmental and social consequences of 
sprawl have launched a “smart growth” movement over the last twenty 
years,20 the U.S. pattern of expanding sprawl and increasing VMT has not 
dramatically abated.  For example, from 1990 until 1997, housing stock in 
low-density metropolitan counties increased at a faster rate (15%) than in 
high-density urban cores (5%).21  A recent study of land use and climate 
notes that “[t]he U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Admini-
stration (EIA) forecasts a 48 percent increase in driving between 2005 and 
2030 . . . outpacing the projected 23 percent increase in population.”22 
As a consequence of continuing sprawl, transportation-related emissions 
are not expected to decrease notwithstanding recent federal legislation to 
 
1980s.  See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:  LAW, SCIENCE, 
AND POLICY 566 (5th ed. 2006).  Notwithstanding that laudable success, overall emissions 
did not significantly change since individual vehicle emission reductions were largely offset 
by large increases in VMT.  Id. at 562. 
 15. See EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 2-3, 21.  “Sprawl” is a complex phenomenon 
that is not reducible to any single variable.  Key attributes of sprawl include low density, 
separation of uses, lack of concentrated employment, residential, or other activity centers, 
and large block size with poor access.  See id. at 60. 
 16. See id. at 21; Edward H. Ziegler, Urban Sprawl, Growth Management, and Sustain-
able Development in the United States:  Thoughts on the Sentimental Quest for a New Mid-
dle Landscape, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 26, 31-32 (2003). 
 17. Ziegler, supra note 16, at 31-33. 
 18. Id. at 32 (citing PETER CALTHORPE, THE NEXT AMERICAN METROPOLIS 47 (Chris 
Dresser & Doug Foster eds., 1993)); see also EWING, ET AL., supra note 13, at 21 (noting 
that VMT has grown three times faster than population). 
 19. BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, at 8. 
 20. See Patricia Salkin, Squaring the Circle on Sprawl:  What More Can We Do? Pro-
gress Toward Sustainable Land Use in the United States, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 787, 788-90 
(2007). 
 21. Ziegler, supra note 16, at 30.  A complex set of legal, political, economic, and social 
factors have contributed to the nation’s sprawl.  Insightful descriptions of these factors can 
be found in Ziegler, supra note 16, at 32-36. 
 22. EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 43. 
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improve fuel efficiency and increase the use of biofuels.  The Energy Inde-
pendence and Security Act of 2007’s fuel efficiency standards are expected 
to increase fleet-wide fuel economy by 34% by 2030,23 and its biofuel re-
quirements are expected to reduce lifecycle GHG emissions by 10% by 
2025.24  Although the combination of these measures would decrease net 
vehicular GHG emissions from cars and light trucks by 23% by 2030 if 
VMT levels stayed constant,25 projected increases in VMT will result in lit-
tle net decrease in emissions.26  Thus, while fuel efficiency measures may 
prevent increases in net transportation emissions, they will not reduce 
emissions overall unless VMT is simultaneously controlled.27 
There is little question that existing VMT is correlated with the degree of 
sprawl.  Numerous studies of metropolitan areas indicate that households in 
areas with greater residential density, greater employment density, mixed 
land uses, and good access to public transit have lower VMT.28  In a recent 
study of the carbon footprints of the nation’s 100 largest metropolitan ar-
eas, Professor Marilyn Brown and her colleagues observed that metropoli-
tan areas with high density development patterns and rail transit tended to 
have lower carbon emissions than other cities.29 
While the correlations are not without controversy, changing future land 
use patterns is likely to lead to future reductions in VMT and its associated 
 
 23. See id. at 3, 43. 
 24. Id. at 43. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 4, 44.  The study projects that by 2030, net emissions will have remained vir-
tually constant at 2005 levels due to increases in VMT. 
 27. See id. at 2, 4 (stating that “technological improvements in vehicles and fuels are 
likely to be offset by continuing, robust growth in VMT” and that “the United States cannot 
achieve . . . large reductions in transportation-related CO2 emissions without sharply reduc-
ing the growth in the number of miles driven”).  Ewing and his co-authors assume that, 
overall, the transportation sector would have to reduce emissions by 33% to achieve climate 
stabilization goals.  Id. at 114. 
 28. BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, at 12 (citing HOLTZCLAW, supra note 8); MARY JEAN 
BÜRER ET AL., LOCATION EFFICIENCY AS THE MISSING PIECE OF THE ENERGY PUZZLE:  HOW 
SMART GROWTH CAN UNLOCK TRILLION DOLLAR CONSUMER COST SAVINGS (2004), avail-
able at http://docs.nrdc.org/air/files/air_06031001a.pdf; EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 6 
(describing studies showing reduced VMT in more compact cities); id. at 55-56; EDWARD L. 
GLAESER & MATTHEW KAHN, POLICY BRIEF:  THE GREENNESS OF CITIES (2008), available at 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/rappaport/downloads/policybriefs/greencities_final.pdf (sum-
marizing preliminary results of a nationwide study analyzing energy use in metropolitan ar-
eas). 
 29. BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, at 22-25.  Residential density and access to rail transit 
are, of course, not the only factors relevant to a municipality’s total carbon footprint.  The 
Brown study observed that a region’s weather, its fuel mix, and fuel prices were also highly 
relevant.  Id. at 25-26; see also GLAESER & KAHN, supra note 28 (evaluating a variety of 
factors affecting a metropolitan area’s greenhouse gas emissions). 
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carbon emissions.  In theory, land use reforms that require localities to 
eliminate their sprawl-inducing zoning codes and provide appropriate in-
centives could lead to increased density, infill development, mixed uses 
that lessen the distance between work, home, shopping, and other activities, 
improved access among important travel points, and neighborhood designs 
that facilitate access to public transit, walking, and bicycle use.  Advocates 
hope that such changes would both reduce the extent of automobile use (by 
shortening distances and decreasing frequency) and change travel mode by 
leading more people to use public transit, bike, or walk instead of driving. 
Professor Reid Ewing and his co-authors have identified six critical fac-
tors for determining the impact of land use changes on future carbon diox-
ide emissions from the transportation sector:  (1) compact development’s 
market share, relative to more sprawling development; (2) the extent to 
which compact development reduces per capita VMT; (3) the level of com-
pact new development relative to the existing base of more sprawling de-
velopment; (4) the degree of urbanization, since compact development 
primarily affects urban VMT; (5) the extent to which reductions in VMT 
are correlated with reductions in carbon emissions; and (6) the proportion 
of motor vehicle travel within overall transportation emissions, since land 
use changes would not affect rail, ship, or airline emissions.30 
Based on the foregoing factors, Ewing and his co-authors predict that in-
creasing compact development relative to sprawl would reduce VMT by 
10% to 14% and reduce the U.S. transportation sector’s carbon dioxide 
emissions by 7% to 10% by 2050.31  They reach this conclusion by assum-
ing, under the first factor, that 60% to 90% of new development will be 
compact.32  Under the second factor, they assume that compact develop-
ment could reduce per capita VMT by 20% to 40%, with the variation de-
pending upon its design.33  Key variables would be the development’s den-
sity, diversity of uses, urban design, destination accessibility, and distance 
to transit.34  For the analysis, the authors assume that the average per capita 
 
 30. See EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 32. 
 31. Id. at 35.  Other studies suggest a more dramatic impact on GHG emission reduc-
tions, projecting that increased density could lead to a 10% reduction below 2001 emissions 
within ten years.  See BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, at 12. 
 32. EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 32-33.  Professor Ewing and his colleagues suggest 
that land use will follow market demand.  However, existing zoning provisions interfere 
with the market’s ability to respond to demand because they mandate low density and sepa-
rate land uses.  See generally JONATHAN LEVINE, ZONED OUT:  REGULATION, MARKETS, AND 
CHOICES IN TRANSPORTATION AND METROPOLITAN LAND-USE 23 (2006) (arguing that exist-
ing zoning impedes market demand for denser development).  Existing zoning restrictions 
would have to be modified to enable the degree of compact development they propose. 
 33. EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 33. 
 34. Id. 
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VMT reduction would be 30%.35  Under the third factor, the authors note 
that the existing housing and commercial building stock is likely to be ex-
tensively expanded and replaced by 2050.36  They assume that, by 2050, 
66% of the built environment will be new or rebuilt.37  Under the fourth 
factor, they assume that the percentage of VMT generated from urban 
(rather than rural) sources will grow from the current 66% to 80%, given 
the increasing trend toward urbanization.38  Under the fifth factor, they 
predict that the VMT associated with compact development could lead to 
slightly higher carbon emissions per mile travelled because city driving 
generates greater emissions per mile than long-distance driving.39  The au-
thors therefore assume that, for every reduction in VMT, carbon dioxide 
emissions will be reduced by only 90%.40  Finally, under the sixth factor, 
the study authors assume that the proportion of travel associated with motor 
vehicles (rather than air, ships, and trains) will increase slightly from 79% 
in 2005 to 80% by 2050.41 
While there is little controversy over the connection between existing 
urban form and high levels of VMT, some have questioned whether future 
land use changes would, in fact, reduce VMT.42  If anti-sprawl land use re-
forms do not lead to decreases in VMT—if the American public proves 
wedded to its automobiles and long distance travel regardless of urban 
form—then land use reforms, whatever their intrinsic merit, would not be 
justified by climate benefits.43 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 33-34.  In the housing sector, Ewing and his co-authors predict that more than 
70% of the 2005 housing stock will be new or replaced by 2050.  Id. at 33.  In the nonresi-
dential sector, Ewing and his co-authors predict that, by 2050, sixty billion square feet will 
be added to the existing 100 billion square feet and that 130 billion square feet will be re-
built.  Id. at 34.  Some of the new construction will also be rebuilt before 2050.  Id. at 33. 
 37. Id. at 34. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id. at 45-46, 56, 81 (observing that vehicle trip frequencies could increase emis-
sions per mile due to the additional emissions resulting from cold starts and that vehicles 
tend to emit more per mile at speeds below forty-five miles per hour). 
 40. Id. at 34-35.  The emissions reduction benefits of VMT reduction clearly outweigh 
the slight increase in emissions resulting from density-induced congestion.  See id. at 56, 81. 
 41. Id. at 35. 
 42. See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 23.  As one study has stated:  “It is one thing to say 
that cities of different urban form have different patterns of energy consumption and a quite 
different thing to assume that realistic policies can turn an inefficient city into an efficient 
one.”  ELENA SAFIROVA ET AL., SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENERGY CONSUMPTION 8 
(2007). 
 43. See SAFIROVA ET AL., supra note 42, at 31.  Given their skepticism that land use poli-
cies could reduce VMT, Safirova and her colleagues conclude that “[p]olicies with the main 
goal of reducing energy consumption should be national, not local . . .  [and that local gov-
ernments should] leave the energy policy to federal and international entities.”  Id. 
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The greatest controversy centers on Ewing’s second factor: the extent to 
which smart growth measures such as increased density, mixed uses, plan-
ning to enhance accessibility, and neighborhood design would, in fact, re-
duce VMT.  Many theoretical studies have evaluated this question, with 
some studies suggesting that greater density would lead to significant VMT 
reductions and others finding much more modest reductions.44  Similarly, 
assessments of the impact of neighborhood design on VMT have had 
mixed results.45 
The studies that find little link between land use reforms and VMT re-
ductions appear to paint an inaccurately pessimistic picture.  They gener-
ally isolate the impact of individual factors, like density or neighborhood 
design, without considering the multiple characteristics necessary for com-
pact development to reduce VMT successfully.46  Professors Badoe and 
Miller have stated that studies that focus solely on density or neighborhood 
design “tend[] to ignore the critical question of connectivity: it is of little 
use having a dense neighborhood which does not have good access to rele-
vant activity destinations.”47  Professor Bartholomew, in this colloquium 
volume, makes clear that accessibility is essential to reducing VMT.48  As 
Professor Ewing and his colleagues suggest, a development’s density, di-
versity of uses, destination accessibility, and distance to transit are all criti-
cal factors in reducing VMT.49  Considering each factor in isolation is 
 
 44. See SAFIROVA ET AL., supra note 42, at 3-4; Daniel A. Badoe & Eric J. Miller, 
Transportation-Land-Use Interaction:  Empirical Findings in North America, and Their 
Implications for Modeling, 5 TRANSP. RES. PART D 235, 248 (2000).  Professor Ewing sug-
gests that while the data are somewhat mixed, most studies find that changes in land use will 
lead to VMT reductions.  EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 65, 71.  He suggests that the key 
issues are not whether the reductions will occur, but how and to what extent.  Id. at 65. 
 45. See Badoe & Miller, supra note 44, at 252. 
 46. See id. at 251-52.  For example, a study attempting to project the VMT impact of 
increasing density through infill in the D.C. metropolitan area focused on several policy op-
tions for reducing VMT, but generally considered only one or two variables at a time.  They 
found that increasing density, or increasing density through a program designed to bring 
workers closer to their jobs, decreased trip distances, but had little, if any, net impact on 
VMT due to increasing trip frequencies.  See SAFIROVA ET AL., supra note 42, at 16-26.  
However, the study did not consider land use changes that might have reduced trip frequen-
cies, such as allowing mixed uses, or changes in public transportation that might have facili-
tated mode switching.  It may have thus underestimated the potential long-term VMT im-
pacts of more comprehensive policy approaches. 
 47. See Badoe & Miller, supra note 44, at 251-52. 
 48. See Keith Bartholomew, Cities and Accessibility:  The Potential for Carbon Reduc-
tion and the Need for National Leadership, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 159, 163-64 (2009). 
 49. See EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 67-71; Bartholomew, supra note 48, at 174-82; 
supra note 28 and accompanying text.  Badoe & Miller note that transit supply is also a 
critical factor in encouraging drivers’ mode shift to public transit, but one that has rarely 
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likely to underestimate the reduction potential of a more integrated ap-
proach.50 
Critics of the land use-VMT connection also contend that early studies 
predicting that land use reforms would reduce VMT failed to consider the 
role of socioeconomic or demographic factors in predicting potential VMT 
reductions.51  Higher-income residents living in dense neighborhoods 
might continue to drive, notwithstanding convenient public transporta-
tion.52  Even if they live in dense neighborhoods, such residents are likely 
to continue to take advantage of the widely-dispersed amenities available in 
large metropolitan areas.53  Professor Ewing and his colleagues have found 
that trip frequencies and mode choices probably are influenced by socio-
economic variables.54  Trip length, however, is less determined by socio-
economic influences,55 and, although mode choices are influenced by so-
cioeconomics, non-automobile choices were more likely with higher 
densities and mixed uses.56  Overall, their report concludes that recent stud-
ies that have controlled for “confounding influences” like socioeconomic 
status “still found strong relationships between urban form and VMT.”57 
Another critique of the studies showing a connection between land use 
and VMT is that they suffer from “self-selection” bias: they fail to prove 
that urban form itself, rather than preexisting preferences to reduce auto-
mobile use, lead to reductions in VMT.58  In response, Professor Ewing ar-
gues that studies controlling for preexisting “bias” find VMT reductions 
regardless of individual preferences.59  Moreover, Professors Ewing and 
 
been considered in the land use-transportation studies to date.  Badoe & Miller, supra note 
44, at 254. 
 50. Based on an exhaustive review of the land-use-transportation literature, Professors 
Badoe and Miller argue that studies evaluating the impact of land use changes on VMT 
would be more accurate if they integrated the relevant components of land use reforms 
rather than considering each separately.  See Badoe & Miller, supra note 44, at 260-61. 
 51. See SAFIROVA ET AL., supra note 42, at 5. 
 52. See Badoe & Miller, supra note 44, at 254 (reporting that socioeconomic factors, 
including income, age, gender, and occupation have an impact on travel behavior and resi-
dents’ likely responses to increasing density). 
 53. Moreover, even if greater density and mixed uses were promoted, it is often difficult 
for both wage earners in a two-earner family to live close to their work when they reside in 
large metropolitan regions.  See William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the 
Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 72 (1999). 
 54. EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 68. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 68-69. 
 57. Id. at 57; see also id. at 61 (describing a study showing that sprawl was a more sig-
nificant predictor of VMT than other socio-demographic variables). 
 58. See id. at 91-94 (describing this critique). 
 59. Id. at 94. 
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Levine suggest that, even if self-selection does make a difference to the 
overall impact of urban form on behavior, considering automobile-
reduction preferences could make studies more, not less, predictive of 
likely VMT changes.60  If land use reforms create additional compact de-
velopment that was formerly undersupplied by the market, then people 
seeking less automobile-dependent lifestyles are likely to gravitate toward 
such communities and reduce automobile use accordingly.61  Controlling 
for their pre-existing propensity to reduce automobile use would underes-
timate the importance of the land use changes that make it possible for 
them to realize their preferences.62 
Despite the complexity of determining the likely impact of land use 
changes on VMT, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that land use 
changes, if made in a comprehensive fashion with attention to the myriad 
factors impacting driving choices, could lead to significant VMT reduc-
tions.  While it is true that those who can afford to do so may continue driv-
ing more than smart growth advocates hope, integrated planning, self-
selection, and increasing awareness of the value of personal energy deci-
sions may lead to greater reductions than skeptics predict. 
Additional uncertainties surround Professor Ewing’s carbon reduction 
predictions.  For example, his prediction that, with appropriate land use re-
forms, 60% to 90% of new development will be compact could be optimis-
tic.63  He is undoubtedly correct that compact development will increase if 
obstacles to its development are removed, since there is strong evidence 
that compact development is currently undersupplied relative to market 
demand.64  Nonetheless, it is not clear that the level of demand will support 
 
 60. See id. at 95-96; LEVINE, supra note 32, at 30-36. 
 61. See EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 96 (observing that if compact development is 
currently undersupplied, as they argue it is, new development will attract those who want to 
reduce automobile use and lead to higher-than-anticipated reductions in VMT).  Badoe & 
Miller state that “[i]ncreased residential density does not directly ‘cause’ reductions in auto 
VMT.  Rather, under the right circumstances, it might attract a resident population with par-
ticular socioeconomic characteristics.”  Badoe & Miller, supra note 44, at 252-53.  The au-
thors contend that residents with certain “desired activity patterns” will make decisions that 
reduce VMT by more than they would have in a more sprawling urban form.  Id. 
 62. See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 36 (“If the land-use effect works largely via self-
selection, then a search for a residual pure effect would underestimate the potential impact 
of land use policy reform.”). 
 63. Even if restrictions on compact development, like minimum density requirements, 
are removed, the government may be limited in its ability to induce developers to actually 
build denser, mixed-use communities.  See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 19, 109-10. 
 64. See id. at 127-28 (reporting that most developers believe there is an inadequate sup-
ply of “alternative development” options relative to demand, and that local regulations are 
the primary obstacle to alternative development); see also EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 
94, 96 (noting that many Atlanta residents would prefer but were unable to find walkable 
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as high a ratio of compact to sprawling development as he and his col-
leagues predict,65 or that the many challenges facing infill development 
will be overcome. 
Another uncertainty is the future ratio between new and existing devel-
opment.  If there is little new development, then existing sprawl will 
largely determine future VMT even if most new development is compact.  
New compact development will impact VMT only if and when it consti-
tutes a significant percentage of the building stock.  If there is less turnover 
in the existing housing and commercial stock by 2050 than Ewing and his 
colleagues predict,66 then land use reforms will have a smaller impact on 
transportation emissions than they predict. 
Ultimately, however, whatever the uncertainties about the extent to 
which land use reforms would reduce VMT, it is clear that failing to reform 
land use and tolerating continued sprawl is fundamentally unsustainable.67  
While such reforms may not achieve as great a carbon reduction as Profes-
sor Ewing and his colleagues predict, not enacting the necessary reforms 
would inevitably result in higher VMT, and carbon emissions, than more 
compact and accessible development.  Land use reforms are one strategy 
among many,68 and are an important component of a broader strategy to 
reduce the transportation sector’s emissions even if their relative contribu-
tion is somewhat uncertain. 
B. Buildings and Energy Consumption 
Existing air pollution policies and prospective climate change legislation 
focus on power plants, the source of 41% of the nation’s carbon dioxide 
 
neighborhoods and stating that there is “ample evidence” that current demand for “walkable, 
transit-oriented environments far exceeds the current supply”). 
 65. Some scholars suggest that existing sprawl represents U.S. citizens’ enduring prefer-
ence for low-density suburban life, a preference that would remain unchanged even if denser 
development were permitted.  See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 65-66 (describing surveys of 
citizen preferences for low-density suburban housing). 
 66. Conceivably, stricter building standards for new buildings could slow the turnover 
of the building stock.  However, efficiency requirements on existing buildings would re-
move that disparity. 
 67. See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 3, 5-6, 48-49 (stating that uncertainty is inevitable, but 
does not provide a reason for reducing existing barriers to compact development). 
 68. Ewing and his colleagues make clear that land use policies alone will not “solve” the 
problem of climate change or the transportation sector’s contribution to it.  See EWING ET 
AL., supra note 13, at 114.  They note that investments in public transportation, changing 
highway funding priorities, and market mechanisms to reduce driving could contribute to 
additional reductions from the transportation sector.  Id. at 115. 
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emissions in 2006.69  Undoubtedly, important gains can and must be 
achieved by direct utility emissions programs that promote a transition to 
renewable and less-polluting sources of energy.  However, the electricity 
sector is unlikely to yield sufficient emission reductions without reducing 
consumer demand.70  Buildings are a central component of that demand.  
Residential and commercial buildings consume 72% of U.S. electricity.71  
In addition, buildings generate direct emissions through natural gas and 
fuel oil consumption.72  Increased energy efficiency in new buildings, ex-
isting buildings, and appliances could have a significant impact on the na-
tion’s electricity demand and its associated emissions, and is the lowest-
cost mechanism available for reducing the electricity sector’s emissions.73 
Improving energy efficiency and alternative energy measures in new 
buildings could significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the carbon footprint 
for new construction.  In California, for example, the Public Utilities 
Commission and Energy Commission have set a goal of zero net energy 
use for residential buildings by 2020 and for commercial buildings by 
2030.74  Key players in urban architecture, like the American Institute of 
Architects and the U.S. Mayors’ Conference, have similarly called for car-
 
 69. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
AND SINKS:  1990-2006 ES-8 (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ 
emissions/downloads/08_ES.pdf. 
 70. Some might argue that demand does not need to be addressed because:  (1) we could 
switch to carbonless nuclear power; or (2) we could develop carbon capture and sequestra-
tion (“CCS”) technologies that eliminate the need to reduce carbon.  Due to the environ-
mental concerns presented by both of these options, I assume for purposes of this paper that 
they do not present viable alternatives to demand reduction.  In addition, increasing energy 
efficiency is likely to be a much more certain and much less expensive approach than devel-
oping carbon capture and sequestration and nuclear power, suggesting that it should be pur-
sued even if research and development of CCS and nuclear power continues.  See 
MCKINSEY & CO., REDUCING U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS:  HOW MUCH AT WHAT 
COST? 60-62 (2007), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/ccsi/ 
greenhousegas.asp [hereinafter MCKINSEY REPORT] (discussing the costs and uncertainties 
associated with CCS and nuclear power). 
 71. See Edna Sussman, Reshaping Municipal and County Laws to Foster Green Build-
ing, Energy Efficiency, and Renewable Energy, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 8 (2008) (citing 
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, BUILDINGS ENERGY DATA BOOK §§ 1.1.3, 1.1.6). 
 72. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 69, at ES-8. 
 73. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at xiv, 34 (stating that improving the energy 
efficiency of buildings and appliances could significantly reduce projected GHG emissions); 
id. at 28 (“[i]ncreased energy efficiency could reduce power load by some 24 percent”).  
The McKinsey Report also observes that, on a lifecycle basis, achieving energy efficiency 
has negative costs.  Id. at 34, 69. 
 74. CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, CALIFORNIA LONG TERM ENERGY EFFICIENCY STRATEGIC 
PLAN:  ACHIEVING MAXIMUM ENERGY SAVINGS IN CALIFORNIA FOR 2009 AND BEYOND 9, 30 
(2008) [hereinafter CPUC PLAN]. 
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bon-neutral buildings by 2030.75  Even some within the building industry, 
an industry traditionally skeptical of environmental mandates, have em-
braced dramatic energy-use reduction goals for new construction.76 
The impact of these goals depends, in part, upon the extent to which the 
future built environment consists of new (green) versus existing (less 
green) buildings.  Current estimates project significant increases in new and 
retrofitted buildings.  The McKinsey Report, a comprehensive assessment 
of GHG abatement strategies, projects that by 2030, the commercial build-
ing stock will grow from seventy-three billion to 108 billion square feet, 
and residential homes will grow from 113 million homes to 147 million, a 
30% increase.77 
Notwithstanding the likely significance of more energy-efficient new 
construction, the existing building stock will remain an important compo-
nent of energy demand, with seventy-six million residential and five mil-
lion commercial buildings.78  Increasing energy efficiency in existing 
buildings could substantially reduce demand.79  According to some studies, 
the majority of existing residences and commercial buildings are poorly in-
sulated and retrofits could significantly increase their efficiency.80  Gener-
ating energy-efficiency improvements and renewable energy investments in 
existing buildings presents numerous practical and political challenges, but 
remains an important step in reducing the nation’s GHG emissions. 
Demand-reduction measures in the land use and buildings context could 
thus play a key role in reducing the nation’s greenhouse gas emissions.  
The next question is:  to what extent have federal lawmakers directly or in-
directly addressed consumption? 
 
 75. See Sussman, supra note 71, at 9. 
 76. The Home Builders Association of Northern California has supported the adoption 
of local building code ordinances for new construction requiring 50% less energy use than 
1990 levels by 2020.  Press Release, Home Builders Assoc. of N. Cal., Home Builders As-
sociation of Northern California Announces Support for Mandatory Green Building Stan-
dards in all Bay Area Communities (Jan. 14, 2008), available at http://www.hbanc.org/ 
files/HBANC_CPUC_0.pdf. 
 77. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 10, 34, 39; see also EWING ET AL., supra 
note 13, at 33-34 (predicting large increase in new and rebuilt residential and nonresidential 
building stock by 2050). 
 78. See Edna Sussman, Building Stock Offers Opportunities to Foster Sustainability and 
Provides Tools for Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & 
POL’Y 17, 18 (2007). 
 79. See Dernbach, supra note 2, at 10029-30 (discussing studies assessing potential for 
energy efficiency improvements).  For example, simply improving attic insulation in cold 
climates with older housing stock “could improve heating performance by nearly 30 per-
cent” from business as usual.  MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 39. 
 80. See Dernbach, supra note 2, at 10018 (noting that 60% of existing residences and 
70% of commercial buildings are inadequately insulated). 
KASWAN_AUTHOR_APPROVAL 2/20/2009  5:21:10 PM 
2009] CLIMATE CHANGE, CONSUMPTION, AND CITIES 269 
II.  THE LIMITS OF EXISTING FEDERAL INITIATIVES 
As I have argued elsewhere, federal legislation to address climate 
change is essential.81  This Part outlines the nature of federal proposals to 
date and the extent to which they directly or indirectly promote the types of 
land use and green building initiatives essential to reducing energy demand. 
A. Proposed Federal Legislation 
With the onset of a Democratic Congress in January 2007, members of 
Congress proposed a flurry of economy-wide climate change bills as well 
as more narrowly-tailored legislation with energy and climate change im-
plications.82  Except as relevant, this Article focuses on the economy-wide 
legislation. 
The proposed climate change bills typically set economy-wide GHG re-
duction goals over time83 and authorize the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) to develop a regulatory or market mechanism for reaching 
the targets.  Traditional regulatory measures could include direct stationary 
source controls.84  Direct controls are, however, unlikely to promote de-
mand reduction if they are modeled after existing performance standards, 
which require emissions reductions per unit of production, rather than re-
quiring reductions in production itself.85  Under a performance standard, a 
 
 81. See Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative Federalism Proposal for Climate Change Legis-
lation:  The Value of State Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 791, 794-97 
(2008) [hereinafter Kaswan, Cooperative Federalism]. 
 82. See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR & BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLI-
MATE CHANGE LEGISLATION IN THE 110TH CONGRESS 5-6, 11-12 (2007); Victor B. Flatt, Tak-
ing the Legislative Temperature:  Which Federal Climate Change Legislative Proposal Is 
“Best”?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 123 (2008). 
 83. See Flatt, supra note 82, at 128-29. 
 84. See Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate Change:  What Role 
for Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 76 (2007) [hereinafter 
Kaswan, The Domestic Response].  Arguably, the Clean Air Act already provides the EPA 
with the authority to create GHG emission standards for new stationary sources, see Holly 
Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater:  Why the Clean Air Act’s 
Cooperative Federalism Framework Is Useful for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 799, 816-30, 832-33 (2008), but the Clean Air Act does not set standards for existing 
sources in attainment areas.  The Supreme Court clarified the EPA’s authority to set GHG 
vehicle emission standards in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
The climate legislation frequently includes additional provisions as well, including re-
search, technology development programs, adaptation provisions, and other climate-change 
related programs. See RAMSEUR & YACOBUCCI, supra note 82, at 7-10; Flatt, supra note 82, 
at 146-47 (discussing technology research and development programs). 
 85. See Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Domestic Climate Change Policy, 38 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10287, 10300 (2008) [hereinafter Kaswan, Environmental Justice] (describ-
ing traditional rate-based emission standards). 
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utility could be required to reduce its per-unit carbon dioxide emissions, 
but would have no incentive to reduce overall energy production.  Without 
an incentive to reduce production, it would not have an incentive to reduce 
demand. 
National policymakers are considering a cap-and-trade system applica-
ble to large emission sources.86  Under a cap-and-trade program, the EPA 
would establish steadily decreasing annual emissions caps and distribute or 
auction emissions allowances to facilities included in the trading system.  
The allowances could be distributed to “upstream” fuel providers, such as 
oil or coal companies, based upon the carbon content of fuels, or “down-
stream” to facilities actually emitting GHGs.  As discussed further below, 
this type of market mechanism could create indirect demand-reduction in-
centives. 
Not surprisingly, Congress’s approach to the transportation sector has 
focused on vehicle efficiency and fuels,87 not federally-mandated land use 
changes to reduce VMT.  Past federal efforts to shape local land use poli-
cies to reduce air pollution generated strong protests from local govern-
ments.88  Somewhat greater federal action is evident in the energy-
efficiency context.  The federal government has already passed appliance-
efficiency legislation and encouraged states to improve their building 
codes.89  In particular, the recently-passed Energy Independence and Secu-
rity Act of 2007 addressed energy efficiency in residential, commercial, 
and federal buildings to a certain extent.90  Congress does not, however, 
appear to be considering a full-fledged energy code to promote energy effi-
ciency.  Nonetheless, a national cap-and-trade program or other market 
 
 86. See Dernbach, Harnessing Individual Behavior, supra note 10, at 111-14; Flatt, su-
pra note 82, at 135; see also LARRY PARKER & BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION:  CAP-AND-TRADE BILLS IN THE 110TH CONGRESS 
(2007). 
 87. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussing the Energy Independence 
and Security Act of 2007 provisions increasing fuel economy and encouraging the use of 
biofuels). 
 88. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. 
REV. 1183, 1206 (1995) (describing local government opposition to early federal efforts to 
incorporate land use measures into federally-drafted clean air implementation plans). 
 89. See Dernbach, Overcoming the Behavioral Impetus, supra note 10, at 19-23 (de-
scribing federal appliance programs and federal requirements to encourage states to adopt 
more energy efficient building codes). 
 90. See Pub. L. No. 110-140, §§ 401-441 (2007).  One of the more promising climate 
change bills, proposed by Senators Lieberman and Warner in the 110th Congress, included a 
requirement for states to adopt enhanced building energy efficiency standards.  Lieberman-
Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110th Cong., §§ 5201-5202 (2008).  Sec-
tions 5101 to 5102 addressed appliance efficiency standards. 
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mechanism could potentially generate indirect demand-reducing mecha-
nisms. 
B. The Limited Role of the Market in Reducing VMT 
In theory, a market mechanism could generate VMT reductions through 
increases in fuel prices.  For example, if a cap-and-trade program required 
oil companies to buy allowances based on their fuel’s carbon content, the 
price of gasoline could increase.  Higher gasoline costs could encourage 
drivers to cut down on discretionary trips and induce those who have ac-
cess to public transit to shift from cars to transit.91  There is some evidence 
that recent increases in gasoline prices have had precisely these effects.92  
The resulting reductions in VMT are likely to be small, however, unless 
and until land use patterns and transportation systems reduce the need for 
extensive automobile use.93  Conceivably, in the long term, increased gaso-
line costs could generate consumer demand for compact development and 
public transportation.94  Housing developers could respond by increasing 
infill development or creating denser, less distant, communities, thereby 
mitigating current trends toward sprawl. 
While the market could play an important role in inducing some behav-
ioral shifts, it is unlikely to prompt a sufficiently widespread reconstitution 
of metropolitan space.  First, given the political unpopularity of increasing 
fuel costs,95 relevant government agencies might offset higher energy 
prices by reducing gasoline taxes, dulling the incentive effects.96  The un-
 
 91. Cf. Dernbach , supra note 2, at 10023-24 (discussing reductions in VMT that could 
result from increasing gasoline taxes). 
 92. Joelle Tessler, With Gas Prices Soaring, Driving Drops, S.F. CHRON., June 20, 
2008, at C3. 
 93. Gasoline price increases in 2008 reduced gasoline consumption to a limited extent.  
See id.  Nonetheless, sprawl has increased the inelasticity of gasoline consumption since 
many individuals do not have alternatives to extensive automobile use.  See Vandenbergh & 
Steinemann, supra note 2, at 1716 & n.198.  Gasoline price increases from 2001-06 reduced 
consumption by only 4%, compared with the 30% reduction that occurred in response to 
similar increases from 1975-80.  Id. 
 94. See generally SAFIROVA ET AL., supra note 42 (concluding that a high tax on VMT 
would have a bigger impact on reducing VMT than increasing housing density or other pro-
posals to modify urban form). 
 95. In the summer of 2008, gasoline prices increased dramatically, creating a political 
outcry and calls for government action to lower prices.  See Zachary Coile, While Congress 
Argues, Gas Costs Keep Climbing, S.F. CHRON., June 11, 2008, at A1 (describing increasing 
prices and political pressure for government action). 
 96. Some of the presidential candidates in 2008 responded to high gas prices in Summer 
2008 by calling for reductions in gas taxes.  See Jim Abrams, Gas Tax Holiday Hopes Run 
over by Fiscal Facts, S.F. CHRON., July 20, 2008, at A7.  Political pressure to reduce gaso-
line taxes could, however, be countered by the highway construction interests who benefit 
KASWAN_AUTHOR_APPROVAL 2/20/2009  5:21:10 PM 
272 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI 
equal distributional impacts of increasing gasoline prices could create an 
additional justification for slowing price increases, since the poor generally 
pay a higher percentage of their income on transportation than average and 
would be disproportionately impacted by increasing gasoline prices.97 
Second, even if gasoline prices increased, the impact of the price in-
crease could be offset by increasing automobile efficiency.  Recently 
passed measures to increase fuel efficiency could reduce fuel use per mile 
travelled and thus lower consumer costs, dampening the price signal from 
increasing fuel costs.98  If consumers’ net fuel costs do not significantly 
change, they would have little incentive to change their housing or driving 
decisions.  While increasing fuel efficiency is critical to reducing transpor-
tation emissions, the negative feedback loop between increasing efficiency 
and reducing VMT should be recognized. 
Third, although increasing fuel costs might theoretically have a marginal 
impact on housing location decisions, other factors such as housing costs, 
size, quality, neighborhood amenities, and schools are likely to dominate—
particularly for the middle- to upper-income residents who are most likely 
to live in outlying suburbs and exurbs.99  Increasing fuel costs are more 
likely to induce the purchase of more efficient cars than to change housing 
location decisions. 
Fourth, and of critical importance, even assuming that price signals cre-
ate consumer demand for less sprawling development, significant legal and 
practical barriers currently prevent or deter developers from building infill 
and more compact development.100  Legally, many suburban towns prohibit 
 
from existing taxes.  See id. (describing highway construction industry’s opposition to cuts 
in gasoline taxes); cf. Dernbach, supra note 2, at 10017, 10023  (noting that increasing gas 
taxes to encourage conservation is likely to be a “political nonstarter” and observing politi-
cal opposition to increasing gasoline prices). 
 97. For those in the lowest-income quintile, transportation costs can consume 40% of 
household income.  See EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 139. 
 98. For example, California predicted that its new GHG vehicle emission standards 
would, by increasing fuel efficiency, result in a net savings to consumers, dampening the 
price signal sent by increasing fuel prices.  See AIR RES. BD., supra note 13 (describing fi-
nancial impact of stricter vehicle emission standards); cf. Dernbach, supra note 2, at 10024 
(observing that, without an increase in gas prices, more stringent vehicle efficiency stan-
dards could lead to increased VMT, offsetting the emission reduction gains achieved by the 
fuel standards). 
 99. In some cases, however, poorer residents are migrating to outlying suburbs in order 
to find larger houses at cheaper prices—they drive until they qualify for a mortgage for the 
kind of housing they desire.  Increasing fuel costs could have a more significant impact on 
the locational decisions of poor and middle-class residents. 
 100. See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 9 (“There is a near-universal acknowledgement among 
transportation and land-use researchers that municipalities regularly employ their land-use 
regulatory powers to exclude denser development.”).  According to one study, the existing 
market for denser development is already frustrated by local zoning restrictions.  Id. at 128. 
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multi-family housing, require minimum lot sizes, and require minimum 
floor-area ratios that lead to sprawling rather than compact development 
and that prevent the higher densities necessary for effective public tran-
sit.101  They also prohibit mixed residential and commercial uses, forcing 
residents to drive to shop or work.102  Suburbs engage in zoning that effec-
tively excludes affordable housing, forcing lower-paid workers in suburban 
commercial centers to commute from poorer areas.103 
As a practical matter, increasing consumer demand might not be fully 
matched by developer supply in light of the difficulties that infill develop-
ment could pose for developers.  Since infill development has conse-
quences for existing residents, infill development could require a more 
complex, expensive, and time-consuming environmental review process 
than building in undeveloped areas.104  To the extent that infill develop-
ment consists of affordable housing, it frequently encounters local resis-
tance.105 
Fifth, higher levels of VMT reduction can be achieved only if compact 
and infill development lead residents to shift from cars to public transit, a 
shift that will occur only if efficient and convenient public transit options 
are available.106  While market pressures for more compact housing could 
conceivably lead residents to advocate for increased transit through the po-
litical process, a cap-and-trade program would, at best, set in motion a long 
and uncertain process for achieving desirable investments in public transit. 
Although a cap-and-trade program could generate price signals that 
might reduce VMT to some extent, the market alone is unlikely to prompt 
the necessary local planning and legal reforms.  A proactive and coordi-
 
 101. See id. at 11, 53; JOHN R. NOLON, WELL GROUNDED:  USING LOCAL LAND USE AU-
THORITY TO ACHIEVE SMART GROWTH 30 (2001) (describing the constraints imposed by 
conventional zoning). 
 102. See Janice C. Griffith, Smart Governance for Smart Growth:  The Need for Regional 
Governments, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1019, 1023 (2001). 
 103. See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 81-85. 
 104. The process is not necessarily more technically difficult, since greenfield develop-
ment can involve complex environmental issues.  It could, however, be more politically dif-
ficult and more heavily litigated in light of existing residents’ vested interests. 
 105. See Florence Wagman Roisman, Sustainable Development in Suburbs and Their 
Cities:  The Environmental and Financial Imperatives of Racial, Ethnic, and Economic In-
clusion, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 87, 99 (1998) (discussing suburban resistance to affordable 
housing). 
 106. See Badoe & Miller, supra note 44, at 254-59 (analyzing impact of transit demand 
and supply on automobile use); cf. EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 113-27, 139 (arguing that 
the VMT-reducing potential of compact development would be enhanced by greater invest-
ment in public transportation—as well as other policy changes—and suggesting that afford-
able housing should be developed near transit stations). 
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nated policy approach to land use and transit would provide a more effi-
cient and effective mechanism for reducing VMT. 
C. The Limited Role of the Market in Increasing Building Efficiency 
Unless Congress chooses to require even more rigorous federal building 
and appliance standards, the primary mechanism by which the federal cli-
mate change bills would affect consumer energy use would be through in-
direct market pressures.  A properly-designed cap-and-trade program 
would require utilities to either reduce their emissions directly or pay to 
purchase additional allowances.  Although the utilities are likely to achieve 
some of the reductions through fuel-switching to less carbon-intensive fuels 
(for example, by switching from coal to natural gas) and through alterna-
tive energy investments (for example, in wind and solar), these options are 
expensive and may require years of development.107  Utilities are therefore 
likely to adopt energy efficiency as an important component of their emis-
sion-reduction strategies,108 and to implement the strategy through con-
sumer demand-reduction programs.  In addition, national utility regulation 
could increase the price of electricity and natural gas, creating a direct mar-
ket pressure for consumers to reduce their consumption.  Each of these 
market-derived mechanisms for reducing demand are considered in turn be-
low. 
1. Utility Demand-Reduction Programs 
A utility demand-reduction program could incorporate a wide variety of 
strategies.109  To encourage energy efficient construction and retrofits, utili-
ties could create incentives that range from simple rebates for energy effi-
cient appliances110 to innovative financing programs that help consumers 
 
 107. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at xv (stating that efforts to develop renew-
able energy, add nuclear power, and modify power plants to reduce carbon “were among the 
most capital-intensive [GHG emission-reduction options] . . . evaluated . . . [and] tend to 
have the longest lead times”); id. at 64-65 (describing barriers to implementation of alterna-
tive power sources). 
 108. For example, California’s Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) has determined 
that increasing energy efficiency is the state’s most cost-effective mechanism for meeting 
demand.  See CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, PUC’S ENERGY LEADERSHIP (2007), available at 
ftp://ftp.cpuc.ca.gov/puc/070319_revenergystory0107.pdf. 
 109. See, e.g., CPUC PLAN, supra note 74, at 5-6 (listing strategies utilities could use to 
enhance energy efficiency). 
 110. See id.  For example, California’s Pacific, Gas & Electric Company, a major north-
ern Calfornia utility, has offered rebates on compact fluorescent light bulbs and appliances.  
See Rebates and Energy Efficiency for Your Home, http://www.pge.com/myhome/ 
saveenergymoney/rebates/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2009). 
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overcome the capital costs associated with efficiency retrofits or alternative 
energy investments.111  If authorized by state regulation, utilities could also 
develop rate structures that rewarded conservation by charging higher rates 
for higher levels of energy use.112  Utilities could engage in a variety of in-
formational and educational programs, including documenting energy use 
and making such information publically available, providing standards for 
labeling homes or products, and increasing public awareness about how 
and why consumers should reduce energy use.113  Such informational cam-
paigns are essential to the success of market incentives, since consumers 
need to be aware of available incentives and how to take advantage of 
them.  Informational campaigns are also crucial to inducing behavioral 
change:  without information about the impact of their personal decisions, 
individuals are less likely to perceive a moral obligation to reduce energy 
use, an obligation that could reduce energy use independent of market in-
centives. 
Notwithstanding the positive role that utility demand-reduction pro-
grams could play, they are unlikely to induce sufficient adoption of energy 
efficiency in buildings.  Although emission limits will give utilities an in-
centive to encourage consumers to reduce energy use, some state utility 
rate regulations create the opposite incentive by tying utility profits to the 
amount of energy generated, thereby creating a disincentive to reducing en-
ergy demand.114  Facing an emissions cap, a utility might emphasize in-
vestments in low-carbon energy sources or carbon sequestration rather than 
reduce demand so as to preserve the level of energy generated.  A compre-
hensive and effective long-term policy would incentivize both low-carbon 
fuel sources and demand reduction efforts. 
Even if utilities do create demand-reduction incentives, like rebates or 
financing, the incentives must operate effectively.  As discussed further be-
 
 111. One financing mechanism under consideration is for utilities to initially finance con-
sumers’ energy efficiency or alternative energy investments.  Consumers would then pay 
back the “loan” through the savings they realize on their monthly utility bills.  See CPUC 
PLAN, supra note 74, at 16 (observing the importance of developing financing mechanisms 
to offset initial capital costs).  The CPUC has recognized that utilities cannot fully fund en-
ergy efficiency; instead the CPUC expects utilities to “leverage and build upon financing 
options available from private markets and other government initiatives.”  Id. 
 112. See id. at 6 (observing generally that price and rate design can create incentives for 
energy efficiency and other demand-side management actions). 
 113. See generally id. at 5, 16, 27 (describing a range of education and information ac-
tivities). 
 114. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, at 37-38, 46; MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, 
at 20 (observing that “power producers’ sustained earnings growth [is often] at odds with 
resource efficiency”). 
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low,115 consumers must be aware of both the incentives and how to take 
advantage of them.  The incentives must also be potent enough to generate 
the hoped-for behavior.  For example, a rebate or financing that did not 
cover the full cost of the investment might fail to have a sufficient motiva-
tional impact. 
2. Direct Market Pressures  
Legislation controlling utilities could also increase the cost of energy, 
creating a direct market incentive for consumers to invest in energy effi-
ciency.116  Given its high carbon intensity, utilities are likely to shift away 
from coal, the nation’s cheapest and most plentiful energy source.117  Utili-
ties are likely to switch to natural gas or to develop new renewable energy 
sources, such as wind, solar, or nuclear energy, that are currently more ex-
pensive than coal-fired power plants.118  As energy costs increase, owners 
would, in theory, have an incentive to retrofit existing buildings to make 
them more energy efficient, and purchasers would increase their demand 
for new green buildings.119 
While higher energy costs are likely to reduce demand to some extent, 
market imperfections and legitimate social policy concerns will constrain 
the market’s effectiveness.120  First, the market might not generate a suffi-
cient price signal to stimulate behavioral changes.121  In some states, utility 
regulations limit the utilities’ ability to pass through higher costs, thus pre-
venting the price signal from flowing to consumers.122  The political con-
troversy associated with increasing energy prices may also make policy-
 
 115. The impediments to unilateral consumer action are discussed more extensively be-
low.  See infra notes 125-39 and accompanying text. 
 116. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at xiii (observing that achieving GHG emis-
sion reductions will require investments in the power sector that are likely to increase elec-
tricity prices). 
 117. See id. at 12. 
 118. See id. at xv. 
 119. One study of metropolitan carbon footprints found a link between higher electricity 
prices and per capita electricity footprints.  See BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, at 26.  Al-
though this Article does not primarily address industry, increasing energy costs could also 
prompt industries to become more energy efficient.  However, some of the same market im-
perfections that could impede consumer responses could also limit industry response. 
 120. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 69-70 (summarizing market imperfections 
that currently impede economically rational energy efficiency investments). 
 121. Professors Doremus and Hanemann note that the acid rain program to reduce sulfur 
and nitrogen oxides from utilities did not lead to energy price increases and, consequently, 
did not incentivize consumer conservation.  See Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 84, at 
814. 
 122. Robert B. McKinstry et al., Federal Climate Change Legislation as if the States 
Matter, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 3, 7 (2008). 
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makers reluctant to design programs that would increase energy prices to a 
level that would motivate change.  As the McKinsey Report states, “moti-
vating end users to act based on price signals alone would likely require 
price stimuli well beyond what may be politically feasible.”123  From a so-
cial justice perspective, the regressive impacts of increasing energy costs 
could also lead policymakers to dampen the price impacts of carbon poli-
cies.124  Absent measures to mitigate regressive impacts, like government-
financed energy retrofits or direct compensation, policymakers may design 
a cap-and-trade program to limit the extent of potential price increases and, 
consequently, limit the extent to which prices would incentivize greater ef-
ficiency. 
Even if price signals do reach consumers, they may fail to motivate re-
ductions in consumption due to the relative inelasticity of energy de-
mand.125  Consumers often fail to respond to price signals due to the “split 
incentives” problem.126  Those making capital investments in buildings or 
appliances, like builders and landlords, have an incentive to minimize ini-
tial investment costs and are therefore less likely to make energy efficiency 
investments, since such investments are likely to be more expensive at the 
outset even though they are more economically efficient in the long-run.127  
 
 123. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 70. 
 124. See Marilyn A. Brown, Market Failures and Barriers as a Basis for Clean Energy 
Policy, 29 ENERGY POL’Y 1197, 1202 (2001) [hereinafter Brown, Market Failures] (observ-
ing that energy costs can be a significant expense for low-income families, “averaging 15% 
compared to 4% for the typical US citizen”). 
 125. See AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., ROLE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN 
CLIMATE POLICY 2 (2008), available at http://www.aceee.org/energy/climate/climate_ 
paper2008.pdf (“Given the low price elasticity of the demand for energy, price increases 
resulting from a carbon cap will have very little effect on energy consumption.”).  The 
McKinsey Report observes that consumers have not, historically, responded to variations in 
energy prices.  MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 70.  Professor Brown notes that 
“[e]nergy efficiency is not a major concern for most consumers because energy costs are not 
high relative to the cost of many other goods and services.”  Brown, Market Failures, supra 
note 124, at 1202.  That suggests that energy price increases would have to be relatively 
high before they would motivate behavioral change. 
 126. See MARILYN A. BROWN ET AL., OAK RIDGE NAT’L LAB., CARBON LOCK-IN:  BARRI-
ERS TO DEPLOYING CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES 101, 102 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter BROWN ET AL., CARBON LOCK-IN].  Professor Brown observes that this problem has also 
been termed the “principal-agent” problem.  See Brown, Market Failures, supra note 124, at 
1199; see also MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 37 (“Issues of agency and duration of 
ownership have historically been a major barrier to capturing energy and carbon efficiency 
in [the air conditioning] sector, as those who bear the initial cost of improvements are often 
not lifetime recipients of the benefits.”); id. at 41. 
 127. Brown, Market Failures, supra note 124, at 1199; see also MCKINSEY REPORT, su-
pra note 70, at 39 (observing that builders do not bear operating costs but do pay first costs, 
so they have “less of an incentive to install efficient building systems”); id. at 40 (discussing 
the split incentive problem in the water heating context).  Tax policies could also impact the 
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Purchasers and tenants, who are more likely to be concerned about life-
cycle costs, do not have control over the relevant capital investments.128  
Builders and landlords have an incentive to invest in energy efficiency only 
to the extent that the investments create higher purchase or rental prices.129  
While there is some evidence that green measures are generating a pre-
mium,130 uncertainty regarding future energy costs could create uncertainty 
about the utility of the investment.131  In addition, green features may be 
more likely to generate a premium for wealthier consumers and commer-
cial entities; poorer consumers may hesitate to pay more up front, even if 
the investment makes long-term economic sense.132  Moreover, since en-
ergy costs are currently a relatively small component of most commercial 
entities’ operating costs, it is not clear that energy efficiency features will 
create a significant premium in commercial markets. 
Consumers may also fail to respond to price signals due to their lack of 
information.133  Consumers currently have little access to information about 
the energy efficiency of either existing or new construction.134  They may 
also be unaware of the extent to which retrofits could increase energy effi-
ciency and result in long-term cost savings, be unaware of appliances’ rela-
tive energy efficiency and associated cost savings, and be unaware of the 
steps they could take to reduce energy use.135 
 
preferred ratio between capital and operating costs, with preferential treatment for operating 
costs creating a disincentive to increasing capital costs.  See id. at 1200. 
 128. Id.; BROWN ET AL., CARBON LOCK-IN, supra note 126, at 102. 
 129. See Brown, Market Failures, supra note 124, at 1200 (discussing dynamic in land-
lord/tenant context). 
 130. See NORM MILLER ET AL., S.D. SCH. OF BUS. ADMIN., DOES GREEN PAY OFF? (2008), 
available at http://www.sandiego.edu/business/documents/USDEconofBeingGreen. 
pdf. 
 131. Cf. Brown, Market Failures, supra note 124, at 1202 (observing that “uncertainty 
about future energy prices” can be a barrier to energy-efficient investments).  Energy-
efficient investments would also generate a sale or rental premium only to the extent that 
consumers have the sophistication to estimate the economic savings associated with effi-
ciency.  See id. (noting that “one of the reasons builders generally minimize first costs . . . 
[is that they believe] (probably correctly) that the higher cost of more efficient equipment 
will not be capitalized into a higher resale value” since purchasers do not understand how to 
do the savings calculation). 
 132. See BROWN ET AL., CARBON LOCK-IN, supra note 126, at 102 (observing that low-
income households and small businesses might find it difficult to access credit to finance 
energy-efficient investments). 
 133. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 41. 
 134. Brown, Market Failures, supra note 124, at 1203; cf. BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, 
at 51 (observing the need for federal legislation requiring greater disclosure of home energy 
consumption at time-of-sale). 
 135. See Brown, Market Failures, supra note 124, at 1201; Doremus & Hanemann, supra 
note 84, at 815; see also MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 22, 37, 41; see generally 
McKinstry et al., supra note 122, at 7 (noting that consumers “may lack the knowledge . . . 
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While energy efficiency improvements are cost-effective in the long-run, 
consumers, particularly low-income consumers, may not have sufficient 
capital to make initial energy-efficiency investments in existing build-
ings.136  Even if they have the means, residents or commercial entities may 
not remain in the building long enough to pay back their investment, and, 
in the event of sale, the energy-efficiency investment may not have created 
a sufficient, or a sufficiently certain, sales premium to justify the initial in-
vestment.137  Studies indicate that consumers are unwilling to make in-
vestments with a payback period longer than two or three years.138 
Finally, to the extent that price signals successfully induce energy effi-
ciency investments, the investments could result in reduced demand that, in 
turn, ultimately reduces energy prices, ending the incentive effect.139  Not-
withstanding the potential for initial success, market mechanisms may thus 
create only a temporary, rather than a long-term, incentive to reduce de-
mand. 
National market-based proposals that focus on utilities could promote 
utility-sponsored demand-reduction programs and directly spur green 
building efforts, both of which would reduce consumption to some extent.  
That said, the invisible hand of the market is unlikely to stimulate enough 
investment in energy efficiency, notwithstanding its economic rational-
 
to implement many demand reduction and energy-efficiency measures”); Vandenbergh & 
Steinemann, supra note 2, at 1725, 1731-32 (observing that individuals have insufficient 
information about energy efficiency to implement climate protection norms). 
 136. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 40-41; Brown, Market Failures, supra 
note 124, at 1202; McKinstry et al., supra note 122, at 7 (noting that consumers may not 
have “financial wherewithal” to invest in energy efficiency).  Professors Vandenbergh, 
Steinemann, and Ackerly propose programs to provide resources to poor households to en-
able them to invest in energy efficiency measures.  See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra 
note 2, at 1735; see generally Michael Vandenbergh & Brooke A. Ackerly, Climate 
Change:  The Equity Problem, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 55 (2007).  California’s Public Utilities 
Commission has developed an innovative Low Income Energy Efficiency program to “pro-
vide no-cost energy efficiency and appliance testing and repair measures to qualified low 
income customers in rental and customer-owned residences.”  CPUC PLAN, supra note 74, 
at 20. 
 137. See CPUC PLAN, supra note 74, at 16 (observing that financing mechanisms need to 
include provisions to obtain repayment from successor owners so that the prospect of selling 
the property does not dissuade current owners from investing in energy efficiency improve-
ments). 
 138. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 22, 40.  For example, in a study in which 
consumers were given a choice between two refrigerators of differing efficiencies, over half 
of the purchasers selected the less expensive and less efficient refrigerator, even though the 
more expensive and more efficient refrigerator provided an annual return on investment of 
around 50%.  See Marilyn A. Brown, Market Failures, supra note 124, at 1198. 
 139. See AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., supra note 125, at 2 (stating 
that energy efficiency measures could change the “demand-supply balance,” and “offset the 
higher energy prices resulting from a cap-and-trade system”). 
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ity.140  More direct mechanisms to spur energy-efficient buildings are nec-
essary.141 
III.  THE LOCAL ROLE IN ADDRESSING CONSUMPTION 
Local decisionmakers currently have significant control over the de-
mand-reduction measures available in the land use, transportation, and 
building sectors.142  Without attempting to be comprehensive, this Part first 
briefly describes the types of local measures that could reduce VMT and 
electricity consumption.143  It then articulates the institutional justifications 
for retaining a degree of local autonomy in developing such measures.  
Lastly, it highlights the extent to which cities have already embraced their 
role in addressing the fundamental causes of climate change. 
A. Types of Local Initiatives to Reduce Energy Demand 
Urban comprehensive plans and zoning play a critical role in establish-
ing land use patterns that could reduce VMT.144  A municipal government’s 
 
 140. As the McKinsey Report states, “simply imposing ‘carbon caps’ on point-source 
emitters might provide the incentive—but not the means—to extract the energy efficiency 
potential that is distributed across millions of energy users.  Policy support might consist of 
standards, mandates and/or incentives . . . .”  See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at xiv 
(observing that energy efficiency is the most cost-effective mechanism for reducing emis-
sions but that “persistent barriers to market efficiency will need to be overcome”); id. at 40 
(suggesting that, given market barriers to installing energy efficiency, “some form of policy 
intervention . . . may be necessary”). 
 141. A study comparing the impact of appliance standards versus market forces found 
that significant additional energy savings were achieved through the promulgation of re-
quired standards.  Brown, Market Failures, supra note 124, at 1205.  The CPUC, which has 
considered its own demand-reduction role, has concluded that “[t]here is no policy tool 
more essential for the widespread and persistent transformation of energy performance in 
California than energy codes and standards.”  CPUC PLAN, supra note 74, at 60.  As the 
CPUC notes, standards “make better energy performance mandatory, and not just for early 
adopters or self-selected consumers . . . .”  Id. 
 142. Cf. Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate Regulation:  
Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681, 701 (2008) (noting that policies re-
lating to “electricity regulation, building energy efficiency, transportation infrastructure, and 
land use and development patterns . . . can be better designed and implemented by [subna-
tional actors]”). 
 143. Local governments could also reduce emissions through many additional measures, 
including facilitating or sponsoring renewable energy sources and controlling methane re-
leases from landfills.  In this Article, however, I focus on local governments’ role in reduc-
ing consumption. 
 144. Such planning does not, however, occur in a vacuum.  It is strongly influenced by 
underlying tax structures and regional and state infrastructure decisions.  See Norman Wil-
liams, Jr., The Three Systems of Land Use Control, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 80 (1970) (describ-
ing land use controls as a function of zoning, property taxes and their role in financing local 
services, and infrastructure choices made by larger entities).  As discussed further below, 
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comprehensive or general plan shapes growth patterns.145  Historically, lo-
cal plans and the zoning regulations that implement them have promoted 
sprawling growth by limiting density and separating land uses so that resi-
dents must drive for work, school, or errands.146  To reverse this pattern 
and create the necessary preconditions for reducing VMT, municipalities 
could revise their general plans to adopt “smart growth” techniques that not 
only limit growth, but allow more compact development.147  As others have 
elaborated in more detail, smart growth and “new urbanist” techniques in-
clude such measures as permitting increased density, allowing mixed uses, 
encouraging infill, and encouraging development patterns that will sustain 
public transportation.148  In addition to direct requirements, zoning provi-
sions could create development impact fees and permitting incentives de-
signed to induce desired development patterns.149 
While land use reforms could reduce VMT somewhat by shortening 
driving distances, more dramatic decreases in VMT are likely to require a 
shift from private cars to public transportation and to non-vehicular transit.  
The two are related:  a number of the land use changes proposed above, 
like increased density and mixed use development, would not only shorten 
driving distances, but facilitate reduced automobile usage.150  Municipali-
 
successful land use reforms will also require addressing a number of the underlying causes 
of existing low-density zoning decisions.  See infra notes 204-30 and accompanying text. 
 145. See NOLON, supra note 101, at 16-17. 
 146. See, e.g., LEVINE, supra note 32, at 2-3; NOLON, supra note 101, at 30. 
 147. See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 82; Ziegler, supra note 16, at 28.  Smart growth 
mechanisms that limit sprawl and encourage denser mixed use “livable” communities have 
also come under the rubric of “New Urbanism.”  See, e.g., EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 
5. 
 148. See, e.g., EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 4; J. Kevin Healy, Local Initiatives, in 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 426-29 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007) (listing 
zoning and land use policies that could reduce municipal GHG emissions).  The California 
Attorney General’s Office (“AG’s Office) has recognized the importance of comprehensive 
planning to reducing future GHG emissions.  Under California’s environmental review stat-
ute, the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), the AG’s Office has sued munici-
palities that have enacted growth-inducing general plans without considering and addressing 
their future greenhouse gas emission consequences.  See Michael B. Gerrard, Climate 
Change and the Environmental Impact Review Process, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 20, 
22 (2008).  The AG’s Office provides a detailed list of direct and indirect GHG-reducing 
measures that municipalities can include in their general plans.  See EDWIN G. BROWN, JR., 
CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT:  ADDRESSING 
GLOBAL WARMING IMPACTS AT THE LOCAL AGENCY LEVEL 5-10 (2008), available at 
http://ag.ca.gov/globalwarming/pdf/GW_mitigation_measures.pdf. 
 149. See Healy, supra note 148, at 428. 
 150. See id. at 427.  For example, public transportation operates best with sufficient 
population density to justify frequent and cost-effective service.  See Buzbee, supra note 53, 
at 74.  Mixed use developments are more likely to make trips to work or errands walkable or 
bicyclable. 
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ties alone or in combination with regional agencies can encourage a shift 
away from private cars by providing comfortable, convenient, reliable, and 
affordable public transportation alternatives.151  Local governments can 
further facilitate non-vehicular transit by making cities easily walkable and 
bikable.152 
Cities can also play a key role in reducing electricity consumption, al-
though their role is somewhat less central than in the land use context.153  
More stringent federal energy efficiency standards for buildings are a dis-
tinct possibility in the future.  For now, however, cities and states are likely 
to continue to play a key role in formulating and implementing programs to 
reduce building-sector energy consumption.  In states that give local gov-
ernments the requisite authority, local governments can draft building 
codes to reduce electricity and natural gas consumption.154  Measures to in-
crease energy efficiency in new buildings could include requirements relat-
ing to structural design, insulation, windows, lighting, heating, ventilation, 
and air conditioning systems, water heating, appliances, and siting or land-
scaping requirements that implicate energy use.155  In some areas, water 
conservation through appropriate landscaping and water-saving household 
appliances could also reduce household carbon use.156  Jurisdictions can 
consider direct design requirements,157 certification requirements that re-
quire a certain level of efficiency, but without specifying the mechanisms 
by which it is to be achieved,158 and incentive programs.159 
 
 151. See Healy, supra note 148, at 425-26. 
 152. See EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 4-5. 
 153. Appliance standards are generally the province of federal, and sometimes state, ac-
tion.  See Kaswan, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 81, at 825.  The federal government 
has played a modest role in establishing minimum energy codes for buildings and could do 
more.  Some states, like California, have strong state energy codes.  See, e.g., Cal. Energy 
Comm’n, California’s Energy Efficiency Standards for Residential and Nonresidential 
Buildings, http://www.energy.ca.gov/title24/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2009).  Even in states with 
strong energy codes, local governments are proposing more stringent energy codes.  See 
Cal. Energy Comm’n, Local Ordinances Exceeding the 2005 Building Energy Efficiency 
Standards, http://www.energy.ca.gov/title24/2005standards/ordinances_exceeding_2005_ 
building_standards.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2009). 
 154. See Healy, supra note 148, at 425-26. 
 155. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 35-40 (describing types of energy effi-
ciency improvements for new and existing buildings).  In addition to reducing demand, 
green building provisions could also require or facilitate renewable energy, like site-based 
solar or wind power.  See Sussman, supra note 71 at 23-35. 
 156. In California, the water supply system is the state’s largest energy consumer.  See 
Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 84, at 827. 
 157. See, e.g., Cal. Energy Comm’n, supra note 153. 
 158. Many jurisdictions require local construction to meet the “Leadership in Energy and 
Environmental Design” (“LEED”) standards established by the U.S. Green Building Coun-
cil.  See U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, LEED INITIATIVES IN GOVERNMENTS AND SCHOOLS 
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Local governments could also impose energy efficiency requirements on 
existing residential and commercial buildings.  One mechanism is to re-
quire energy efficiency improvements at the time of sale.160  Government 
regulations or programs could also complement and enhance market incen-
tives for energy efficiency by increasing the quality and availability of con-
sumer information161 to enhance the efficacy of existing market incentives 
and help consumers realize green preferences.162  Local government-
sponsored financing mechanisms could help consumers address the initial 
capital costs of energy efficiency investments.163 
Even if state or federal governments end up playing a stronger role in es-
tablishing relevant building codes, local governments are likely to continue 
to play a key role in ensuring that the codes are adequately enforced.  State 
energy codes are generally enforced at the local level by local building in-
spectors.  Adequate local enforcement is key to effective implementa-
tion.164 
 
(2008), available at https://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentID=691.  Although 
adopting green building standards does not automatically result in energy savings, the green 
building requirements are likely to increase energy efficiency.  Energy efficiency is one 
among several categories that receive points in the certification process, however, creating 
the possibility that a building could be certified through non-energy-related green features.  
The number of points accrued determines the level of LEED certification achieved, ranging 
from simple “Certified” to “Platinum.”  Jurisdictions differ significantly in the stringency of 
the certification they require or reward. 
 159. Local government incentive programs include policies like permit fee reductions, 
expedited permitting, and property tax adjustments.  See YUDELSON ASSOCS., NAT’L ASS’N 
OF INDUS. & OFFICE PROP., GREEN BUILDING INCENTIVES THAT WORK:  A LOOK AT HOW LO-
CAL GOVERNMENTS ARE INCENTIVIZING GREEN DEVELOPMENT (2007), available at 
http://www.naiop.org/foundation/greenincentives.pdf. 
 160. See CPUC PLAN, supra note 74, at 16, 84. 
 161. See id. at 32 (discussing government programs to benchmark commercial buildings 
and require disclosure of energy information as well as potential local government programs 
to condition the renewal of building occupancy certificates on minimum energy bench-
marks). 
 162. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text (discussing the role of information in 
enhancing market incentives and inducing behavioral change). 
 163. See, e.g., CPUC PLAN, supra note 74, at 32 (discussing importance of financing to 
encouraging investments in energy efficiency in existing buildings).  In 2008, California 
adopted legislation that would give cities the authority to provide local citizens with loans 
for energy efficiency and renewable energy and allow them to repay the loan over time 
through their property taxes.  See Margot Roosevelt, Green Energy Financing OK’d, L.A. 
TIMES, July 23, 2008, at B3. 
 164. Cf. CPUC PLAN, supra note 74, at 16 (observing the importance of effective en-
forcement of energy codes); id. at 61, 82 (observing that the state’s energy code is enforced 
by local governments); id. at  85 (noting that local enforcement appears to be weak). 
KASWAN_AUTHOR_APPROVAL 2/20/2009  5:21:10 PM 
284 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI 
B. Institutional Justifications for Local Control 
There are strong institutional justifications for retaining a local or re-
gional role in reducing consumption.  First, much of the consumption that 
lies behind GHG emissions, like driving behavior and buildings’ energy 
use, takes place in cities.165  While that does not preclude other levels of 
government from taking regulatory action,  municipalities are in a strong 
position to address the causes of climate change. 
Furthermore, the sources of GHG emissions and the opportunities for 
GHG emission reductions vary considerably across the nation.166  Local 
governments are well positioned to determine the most significant sources 
of demand within their jurisdiction and tailor strategies accordingly.167  For 
example, cities that rely on carbon-intensive energy sources, like coal-fired 
power, might devote particular attention to increasing energy efficiency 
and encouraging local renewable energy in comparison with cities, like Se-
attle, that use less carbon-intensive sources of electricity.168  Weather pat-
terns might also determine priorities; cities in both hot and cold climates 
might focus more on energy efficiency measures than cities in more tem-
perate climates.  The most suitable strategies could also depend upon 
whether the area anticipates growth.  Changing land use policies to reduce 
sprawl and creating new building standards are particularly important in 
growing areas,169 while strategies to address existing buildings are likely to 
predominate in areas where population is stagnant.  The nature of a re-
 
 165. As Professor Robert Verchick has stated:  “[Cities] are where the pollution is . . . .”  
Robert R.M. Verchick, Why the Global Environment Needs Local Government:  Lessons 
from the Johannesburg Summit, 35 URB. LAW. 471, 475 (2003). 
 166. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 22, 67-68.  The McKinsey Report ob-
serves that GHG abatement strategies have significantly differing costs in different regions 
reflecting “regional differences in population growth and/or density, carbon intensity of lo-
cal power general portfolios, energy productivity, climate, availability of renewable energy 
sources, forest cover, agricultural orientation, concentration of industrial activity, and other 
factors.”  Id. at 22. 
 167. See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan 
Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1124 (1996) (observing that local governments can provide 
goods and services efficiently given their capacity “to match distinctive local conditions and 
preferences”); Buzbee, supra note 53, at 94 (arguing that local governments have land use 
authority because their local knowledge gives them the requisite institutional competence); 
Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Legislation in Context, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 245, 247-48 (2008) 
[hereinafter Osofsky, Climate Change]. 
 168. See GLAESER & KAHN, supra note 28, at 5 (noting differences in carbon intensity of 
regionally-common fuel sources); see also JOHN BAILEY, LESSONS FROM THE PIONEERS:  
TACKLING GLOBAL WARMING AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 3, 9 (2007), available at 
http://www.newrules.org/de/pioneers.pdf (observing that different fuel sources have a sig-
nificant impact on cities’ carbon footprints). 
 169. See EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 78 (observing that high growth areas are more 
likely to reduce VMT through smart growth land use measures). 
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gion’s economic base could also influence appropriate strategies.  Mixed 
uses may be an appropriate land use strategy for non-polluting industries 
and employers, but impose unacceptable public health risks in areas that 
rely on heavier industry. 
Many classic arguments in favor of local control resonate in democratic 
theory.  Given the local consequences of land use and building policies and 
their importance in shaping metropolitan space, federalism advocates 
would argue that local governments should be given the power to express 
the preferences of local citizens, preferences that could be diluted and 
harder to discern in larger fora.170  Moreover, some argue that citizens can 
more easily and effectively participate in local governmental decisions than 
in state or national venues.171 
Local governments can also serve as classic “laboratories of invention.”  
The local climate change and smart growth initiatives blossoming around 
the country will provide insights into the strength and weaknesses of a va-
riety of strategies.172  Rather than locking into one, potentially flawed, 
model, the entire nation could benefit from a diversity of approaches. 
C. The Local Commitment 
Local action is not only practically important and institutionally justi-
fied, but well underway.  Local governments are recognizing their impor-
tant role in climate change policy.  As of January 25, 2009, 910 mayors 
have signed the U.S. Conference of Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement 
(the “Agreement”),173 drafted in 2005 in response to the United States’ con-
tinued rejection of the Kyoto Protocol.  The Agreement commits its signa-
tories to strive to “meet or beat” the Kyoto Protocol’s climate change ob-
jective for the United States of 7% below 1990 emissions by 2012,174 an 
 
 170. See Briffault, supra note 167, at 1123-24; Buzbee, supra note 53, at 92. 
 171. See Briffault, supra note 167, at 1123-24; Verchick, supra note 165, at 475-77. 
 172. See Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environ-
mental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 182-83 (2006); Stewart, supra note 142, at 700-01. 
 173. See Map of Participating Mayors, Mayors’ Climate Protection Center, 
http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/map.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2009).  Over 172 
U.S. municipalities have joined the “Cities for Climate Protection Campaign” of the Interna-
tional Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (“ICLEI”), which provides resources for 
municipalities who follow a prescribed process for setting greenhouse gas emission reduc-
tion goals. 
 174. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, U.S. MAYORS CLIMATE PROTECTION AGREEMENT 
(2005), available at http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/documents/mcpAgreement. 
pdf. 
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ambitious target in light of the almost 15% increase in U.S. emissions be-
tween 1990 and 2006.175 
Land use, transportation, and buildings policies figure prominently 
among the strategies identified within the agreement for meeting local 
emissions targets.176  Participating mayors have agreed to adopt anti-sprawl 
land use policies and to promote bicycles, public transit, and programs to 
reduce commuting.177  They also commit to making energy efficiency a 
“priority” by updating building codes and promoting sustainable building 
practices generally, and by improving energy efficiency within municipal 
buildings more specifically.178 
Of course, signing the agreement does not guarantee its effective imple-
mentation.  A January 2007 assessment of ten cities whose mayors had 
signed the Agreement and are known as environmentally active indicated 
that all of the cities had recently increased, rather than decreased, their 
GHG emissions and were highly unlikely to meet their reduction goals.179  
Population increases contributed to the emissions growth in some in-
stances, but in others GHG emissions outpaced population growth, reveal-
ing an increase in per capita emissions.180  As of early 2007, cities were 
hoping that changes in state or federal policy, like increasing renewable en-
ergy and increasing vehicle fuel economy, would achieve most of the re-
ductions,181 and had undertaken only a few discrete one-time actions at the 
local level.182  Municipal strategies to comply with the Agreement have no 
doubt evolved since the January 2007 report.  The report nonetheless re-
veals the risk of a gap between political rhetoric and concrete implementa-
tion. 
 
 175. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 69, at ES-4. 
 176. In addition to land use and buildings, other emission reduction strategies the Agree-
ment suggests include promoting alternative energy, minimizing emissions from waste dis-
posal, reducing emissions from local vehicle fleets, increasing water use efficiency and re-
cycling, promoting urban forests as sinks and for shade, and public education functions.  
U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 174. 
 177. Id. at 1 (advocating “[a]dopt[ing] and enforce[ing] land-use policies that reduce 
sprawl, preserve open space, and create compact, walkable urban communities” and 
“[p]romot[ing] transportation options such as bicycle trails, commute trip reduction pro-
grams, incentives for car pooling and public transit”). 
 178. Id. 
 179. BAILEY, supra note 168, at 10-12. 
 180. Id.  Of the ten cities examined, the only ones to reduce their per capita GHG emis-
sions were Austin, Texas, and Portland, Oregon.  Id. at 12. 
 181. Id. at 13. 
 182. Id. at 13-14.  For example, many of the cities reduced municipal emissions through 
capturing methane from landfills.  Id. at 14. 
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Several examples reveal the potential inherent in local action to reduce 
demand.  Portland, Oregon has already seen the fruits of its earlier land use 
and transit policies.  Portland’s sustainable development initiatives began 
in the 1970s, when Portland adopted urban growth boundaries to stem 
sprawl and established the nation’s first local energy policy.183  To imple-
ment the carbon dioxide reduction plan it adopted in 1993, the city devel-
oped two new light rail lines and increased public transit use by 75% from 
1990 levels.184  The city has also overseen the construction of green build-
ings and weatherized 10,000 multi-family units as well as 800 homes.185  
Although Portland has failed to reduce its overall emissions and failed to 
meet its carbon dioxide reduction goals due to population growth, the city’s 
multiple GHG reduction initiatives have reduced per capita emissions by 
12.5% since the early 1990s.186  Arguably, reductions in per capita emis-
sions are more significant than reductions in net emissions, since the new 
Portland residents are likely emitting at a lower per capita rate than they 
would have emitted in another location. 
The Sacramento, California region has engaged in an ambitious regional 
planning effort to counter projected increases in congestion and pollution.  
In 2004, a regional agency representing the six counties comprising the 
greater Sacramento, California metropolitan area adopted a “Preferred 
Blueprint Scenario for 2050” that outlined regional growth principles and 
identified regional growth parameters that local governments can, on a vol-
untary basis, implement.187  The relevant growth principles include using 
existing assets through infill development, compact development, mixed 
use development, and providing alternative transportation alternatives.188  
The regional agency predicts that, by 2050, the Blueprint will lead to an 
 
 183. See Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks?:  Local Climate 
Change Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 409, 415-16 (2008) [hereinafter Osofsky & Levit, The 
Scale of Networks]. 
 184. Id. at 417.  Seattle has also developed a regional transit plan to reduce driving and 
increase public transportation.  Healy, supra note 148, at 425. 
 185. Osofsky & Levit, The Scale of Networks, supra note 183, at 417. 
 186. Id.  Portland’s success is attributable not only to its land use and transportation ini-
tiatives, but also to investments in energy efficiency, solid waste and recycling, urban for-
estry, and renewable energy.  Id. at 416. 
 187. See SACRAMENTO AREA COUNCIL OF GOV’TS & VALLEY VISION, PREFERRED BLUE-
PRINT ALTERNATIVE (2007) [hereinafter PREFERRED BLUEPRINT ALTERNATIVE], available at 
http://www.sacregionblueprint.org/sacregionblueprint/the_project/BP_Insert_JAN_2005.pdf
; Ana Campoy, With Gas Over $4, Cities Explore Whether It’s Smart to Be Dense, WALL 
ST. J., July 1, 2008, at A1.  Although voluntary, many of the local governments are imple-
menting the blueprint’s agenda.  See Sacramento Blueprint, Local Government Features, 
http://www.sacregionblueprint.org/sacregionblueprint/the_project/localGovtFeatures.cfm 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2009). 
 188. PREFERRED BLUEPRINT ALTERNATIVE, supra note 187. 
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average household VMT of 34.9 miles per day instead of the 47.2 miles per 
day predicted based on current development trends.189  Carbon dioxide 
emissions in 2050 are projected to be 14% lower than the business-as-usual 
estimate.190  In conjunction with the regional Blueprint, the regional agency 
proposed a draft municipal transportation plan in March 2008 that is de-
signed to complement the smart growth initiatives outlined in the Blueprint 
and facilitate driving reductions and alternatives.191 
Elsewhere, individual development projects are increasingly combining 
uses and becoming denser.192  Rejecting the pattern of sprawling single-
family home development, the California cities of San Mateo and San Jose 
have recently unveiled plans for new mixed use developments providing a 
variety of housing options.193 
On the green building front, according to the U.S. Green Building Coun-
cil, 152 localities around the country are moving beyond federal and state 
minimum requirements to adopt their own green building requirements for 
municipal and, in some cases, private, construction—requirements that 
could lead to more energy-efficient buildings.194  Many of these efforts 
have been initiated within the last year. 
The commitment and initiative being taken at the local level is inspiring 
and justified.  Local action will be critical to achieving deep GHG emission 
reductions.  The fundamental question is:  can we rely on individual locali-
ties to take the necessary initiative, or do we need broader state and federal 
structures through which to stimulate and shape local actions?  The next 
section addresses this question. 
 
 189. Id. at 9. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See SACRAMENTO AREA COUNCIL OF GOV’TS, METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION 
PLAN FOR 2035 (2008) [hereinafter METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION PLAN], available at 
http://sacog.org/mtp/2035/final-mtp. 
 192. See EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 27 (describing a 2003 listing showing 647 “new 
urbanist” developments). 
 193. See John King, Smart Growth at the San Mateo Racetrack, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 17, 
2008, at B1; James Temple, San Jose Leaders Try to Reverse Urban Sprawl, S.F. CHRON., 
Aug. 17, 2008, at B1. 
 194. U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, supra note 158.  Although adopting green building 
standards does not automatically result in energy savings, the green building requirements 
are likely to increase energy efficiency.  Many of the local requirements or incentives are 
tied to the LEED certification requirements created and implemented by the U.S. Green 
Building Council.  Id.  Energy efficiency is only one among several categories that receive 
points in the certification process, creating the possibility that a building could be certified 
through non-energy-related green features. 
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IV.  IMPEDIMENTS TO LOCAL ACTION 
Notwithstanding the importance of existing local actions and the central-
ity of local governments to achieving climate change goals, local govern-
ments are unlikely to undertake sufficient efforts solely on their own initia-
tive.  Disincentives to collective action, political, social, and economic 
forces, and federal and state laws are all likely to impede sufficient local 
action.  Ultimately, federal and state laws will need to establish cooperative 
federalist structures that require the necessary local action while simultane-
ously maximizing the benefits of local autonomy. 
A. Collective Action Impediments to Local Initiatives 
With a transboundary international legal problem like climate change, 
collective action problems are likely to create disincentives for the neces-
sary level of local initiatives.  Addressing climate change could create a 
fundamental disparity in the distribution of costs and benefits.  Climate 
change measures could impose costs on local governments by impairing 
their ability to attract desired or exclude undesired development.195  Mean-
while, climate change benefits accruing from local action are incremental, 
remote, and widely distributed.  A community that incurs local economic 
costs by adopting land use changes or more stringent building standards 
will not reap corresponding climate change benefits.196 
That said, the cost/benefit calculus in the climate change context is com-
plicated.  First, although a given community cannot protect itself from the 
environmental consequences of climate change by reducing its emissions, it 
may act in the hope that it will inspire similar action in other localities and 
that the cumulative impact of local reductions will be environmentally sig-
nificant.197 
Second, local government actions could lead to non-climate benefits that 
compensate for local costs.  Local political leaders may perceive personal 
political benefits to setting popular climate change goals.  If political capi-
tal is the primary benefit, however, then local regulation may not go far, 
since concrete implementation steps could be more politically controver-
 
 195. See generally GLAESER & KAHN, supra note 28, at 11 (observing that environmen-
tally-friendly measures are likely to deter development). 
 196. See SAFIROVA ET AL., supra note 42, at 31 (observing that urban areas will not reap 
climate change benefits from land use changes and that policies to reduce energy consump-
tion should therefore “be national, not local”); Kirsten H. Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-
Motives and State and Local Climate Change Initiatives, 2 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 
119 (2008). 
 197. See Engel & Orbach, supra note 196, at 129. 
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sial.  As noted above, cities risk a gap between rhetoric and implementa-
tion. 
Conceivably, however, smart growth and building requirements could 
generate substantive short-term non-climate co-benefits that would out-
weigh their costs, like healthier and more livable cities, preservation of 
open space, and cheaper infrastructure and energy costs.198  But smart 
growth and green building measures have not revolutionized the built envi-
ronment to date, raising questions as to whether cities truly value their 
benefits more than their perceived costs.  Unless cities are convinced of as-
sociated non-climate-related co-benefits, the imbalance in costs and bene-
fits renders sufficiently widespread and vigorous local action unlikely.199 
Moreover, the leakage concerns that have haunted state legislatures arise 
in the local context as well and may disincentivize local action.200  Munici-
palities considering zoning or green building limitations face the risk that 
such limitations would drive housing or commercial developers to locations 
that do not impose constraints.201  If limitations in fact drive development 
elsewhere, then a municipality that adopted local climate change regula-
tions would have incurred the loss of desired development to no end, since 
the development, and its problematic emissions, simply went elsewhere.  
The fear of leakage thus creates a disincentive for local action. 
Local entities might also hope to “free ride” on other localities’ ef-
forts.202  Given the global benefits of climate change reduction efforts, in-
dividual cities might hope to benefit from other cities’ initiative without 
making any (perceived) sacrifices themselves. 
Cities have already taken a surprising level of initiative in light of these 
collective action challenges.  Nonetheless, the collective action challenges 
suggest why seemingly enthusiastic cities may fail to follow through on 
their political rhetoric, and why some cities may not jump on the band-
 
 198. See EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 27-31; Stewart, supra note 142, at 691-92 (not-
ing the “collateral local benefits” that cities might experience if they adopt transportation, 
land use, and building measures to address climate change). 
 199. See Stewart, supra note 142, at 701 (“Local jurisdictions will presumably not under-
take independent climate regulation unless they expect that the economic and environmental 
benefits will outweigh the costs, including leakage costs”). 
 200. See Kaswan, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 81, at 795 (discussing how leak-
age concerns are likely to chill unilateral state action to address climate change). 
 201. See GLAESER & KAHN, supra note 28, at 11 (suggesting that environmental land use 
measures deter development and shift it to areas with less environmental regulation); 
Ziegler, supra note 16, at 59 n.127 (observing that cities that attempt to control sprawl risk 
losing their tax base to surrounding towns). 
 202. See Engel & Orbach, supra note 196, at 120, 129 (suggesting that free riding would 
be a rational response where actors cannot reap the direct benefits of their regulatory ac-
tions). 
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wagon at all.  Collective action problems are not, moreover, the only im-
pediment to local initiatives, particularly when they implicate politically 
and socially sensitive land use parameters. 
B. Political, Economic, and Social Disincentives to Local Action 
On a fundamental level, inertia is a powerful force.  Residents, city 
planners, and developers may be reluctant to envision alternative models.  
Individuals, comfortable with their existing lifestyles, could find change 
unappealing or threatening.203 
Local governments, properly serving their democratic function, also fo-
cus on local rather than regional—much less global—interests.  This paro-
chialism creates a powerful force against land use or other local changes.  
“Fiscal zoning” designed to maximize municipal revenue and minimize 
costs has driven (and is likely to continue to drive) purely local land use 
decisions. 204  Communities compete for continued residential or business 
expansion.205  Suburban communities have engaged in low-density zoning 
to keep property values high and exclude affordable housing that could lead 
to higher public service costs.206  As a political matter, existing residents 
who consciously chose a spacious suburban environment are likely to resist 
proposals for infill or for more compact development.207  Even communi-
ties that have adopted “smart growth” measures have sometimes served pa-
rochial rather than regional interests.  As Professor Edward Ziegler has ob-
served, land use measures with a “smart growth” patina have set growth 
boundaries to preserve open space for the benefit of local residents, but 
 
 203. See Griffith, supra note 102, at 1025; see also DEBORAH SALON & DANIEL SPERLING, 
CITY CARBON BUDGETS:  A POLICY MECHANISM TO REDUCE VEHICLE TRAVEL AND GREEN-
HOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 9-10 (2008), available at 
http://pubs.its.ucdavis.edu/publication_detail.php? 
id=1178 (observing that a significant challenge to developing local strategies to reduce 
VMT will be citizens’ willingness to accept lifestyle changes); Ziegler, supra note 16, at 61 
& n.138 (noting that regional efforts to achieve effective smart growth will be difficult in 
light of voters’ fear of the unknown). 
 204. See Briffault, supra note 167, at 1134; Williams, supra note 144, at 82-85 (describ-
ing how tax policies create exclusionary zoning incentives). 
 205. See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 95. 
 206. Briffault, supra note 167, at 1134; see also BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, at 35; 
Ziegler, supra note 16, at 58. 
 207. See Griffith, supra note 102, at 1024; Peter W. Salsich, Toward a Policy of Hetero-
geneity:  Overcoming A Long History of Socioeconomic Segregation in Housing, 42 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 459, 497-98 (2007)  (describing suburban opposition to development pro-
posals that would increase density). 
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have not increased density, thereby pushing new development even further 
out and increasing sprawl to the detriment of the region.208 
Nor do local governments function as perfect democracies.  While local 
governments have the potential to provide a broader participatory forum 
than their state or federal counterparts, local governments are subject to 
power politics.  For example, influential developers and builders are likely 
to oppose constraints, like stricter building codes or affordable housing re-
quirements, that they fear will impair their autonomy and profitability.  
Real estate companies could resist energy efficiency requirements at the 
point of sale due to concerns about their impact on property transactions.  
These interested parties deserve a voice in local government deliberations.  
However, in comparison with the diffuse public interest in addressing cli-
mate change, the developers could end up having a disproportionate role in 
decisionmaking.209  Ironically, contrary to the image of local democracies 
as more receptive to citizen input, citizens may have more difficulty orga-
nizing their diffuse environmental interests into effective lobbying at the 
local level than at the state or national level.210 
While local municipalities represent the democratic will of their con-
stituents, they do not, by definition, respond to the needs of those affected 
by but excluded from the communities’ decisions.211  In particular, al-
though many communities rely on workers who cannot find affordable 
housing within the community, these workers do not have any influence on 
the community’s exclusionary zoning practices.  Moreover, if regional or 
state-level decision-makers determine that municipalities should not pre-
vent dense development, then that determination also represents the democ-
ratic will, a will expressed on a larger and more representative scale.212 
More fundamentally, local governments, both urban and suburban, may 
face political obstacles to adopting infill land use strategies that would in-
tegrate both cities and suburbs.213  As Professor Florence Wagman Rois-
man has stated bluntly: cities and suburbs “have separate governments in 
 
 208. Ziegler, supra note 16, at 57, 58, 62. 
 209. See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 80-84 (describing the disproportionate role of trans-
portation and real estate industries relative to diffuse citizen interests). 
 210. See id. at 90. 
 211. See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 42; Briffault, supra note 167, at 1132-33; see also id. 
at 70 (noting that those excluded from communities will be unable to have a voice in their 
zoning regulations). 
 212. See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 42 (“Notwithstanding an ostensible American predi-
lection for participatory local governance, any geographic aggregation in a democratic sys-
tem includes some dimension of the people’s will and excludes others.”). 
 213. Cf. id. at 82 (noting the “tough[] political fight [that] awaits those who attempt to 
redress the NIMBYism and regulatory opposition that now face most infill projects”). 
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large part because of a desire to have white and non-poor people live apart 
from those who are poor and non-white.”214  She cautions that these racial 
and economic divisions “cannot be cured without reducing or eliminating 
the desire for separation and the policies that promote the separation.”215  
As long as racial bias continues, middle and upper-income individuals may 
be reluctant to move back to the cities or inner suburbs.  Similarly, suburbs 
may be unwilling to adopt zoning revisions that permit affordable housing 
for lower-paid suburban workers seeking housing closer to their jobs.216 
Middle and upper-class resistance to returning to the urban core is also a 
reaction to the low quality of urban municipal services.  Urban cores, as 
well as some inner-suburbs, typically have poorer schools (both financially 
and in terms of performance), deteriorating infrastructure, less open space, 
and concerns about public safety.217  In light of the deterioration of services 
within poor urban centers, there may be little market for upscale housing 
within denser urban boundaries,218 and little reason for local or regional 
governments to expect infill land use policies to succeed.219 
Infill policies also face resistance from residents within the urban center.  
Remembering the legacy of earlier urban renewal efforts that ousted poor 
residents for the benefit of middle and upper-income residents, existing in-
ner-city residents fear that infill developments could lead to gentrification 
that displaces poor residents who have few options due to shortages of af-
fordable housing and the persistence of housing discrimination.220  Poor 
residents in urban cores could also resent efforts to promote housing for al-
 
 214. Roisman, supra note 105, at 110; see also Buzbee, supra note 53, at 64-65 (observ-
ing that increasing suburbanization partly resulted from “white flight” from urban centers). 
 215. Roisman, supra note 105, at 111. 
 216. Cf. Salsich, supra note 207, at 473 (citing Professor William Fischel’s observation 
that “local zoning has a systematic bias toward low-density residential uses in part because 
of a desire to keep new housing for low-income households out of the community.”). 
 217. See Roisman, supra note 105, at 102 (describing white perceptions of urban cen-
ters); Ziegler, supra note 16, at 34; cf. Buzbee, supra note 53, at 67-70 (suggesting that resi-
dents have left central cities due to concerns regarding infrastructure, education, and crime 
and discussing sprawl’s impact on central cities). 
 218. See Ziegler, supra note 16, at 43. 
 219. There has been some “back-to-the-city” movement in recent years, but the levels 
remain quite modest.  See Roisman, supra note 105, at 113. 
 220. See john a. powell, Race, Poverty, and Urban Sprawl:  Access to Opportunities 
through Regional Strategies, in GROWING SMARTER:  ACHIEVING LIVABLE COMMUNITIES, 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, AND REGIONAL EQUITY 51, 61, 65 (Robert D. Bullard, ed., 2007).  
Inner-city residents may fear that the city of the future concentrates the wealthy in the 
newly-desirable inner-city, and relegates the poor to fringe suburbs where they are isolated 
by high transportation costs.  Professor powell has noted that, in richer cities with few low-
income census tracts, new development does appear to have displaced the poor into more 
remote suburbs.  See id. 
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ready-privileged middle and upper-income residents.221  Finally, changing 
the racial and income structure of a city could dilute the power and cultural 
identity established by the city’s existing residents.222 
In this uncomfortable political, economic, and social reality, local gov-
ernments may well resist calls for zoning reform.  Parochial economic in-
terests, the realities of power politics, and enduring racial tensions could all 
undermine the prospects of what appear to be rational VMT-reducing land 
use reforms. 
C. Federal and State Obstacles to Local Action 
Federal and state policies have also created incentives for sprawl and 
high VMT that, on their flip side, create disincentives for smart growth.  As 
noted above, state tax structures that require local governments to finance 
local services have created a strong incentive for suburban governments to 
engage in fiscal zoning that encourages development that will generate 
high tax revenue but require few services.223  As a consequence, many sub-
urbs court tax-generating commercial development but preclude affordable 
housing, since low-cost housing generates relatively little in tax revenue 
but leads to infrastructure costs like public schools.  With little affordable 
housing in the new suburban business centers, lower-paid workers face 
long commutes.224 
State and federal infrastructure financing also has a significant impact on 
land use decisions.225  Professor Marilyn Brown observes that states re-
ceive highway funding from the Federal Highway Administration based, in 
part, upon the taxes they contribute to the Highway Trust Fund, which is, in 
turn, based upon each state’s vehicle use.226  Since efforts to cut vehicle use 
would reduce transportation funding, the financing system creates a disin-
centive for state transportation officials to design a transportation infra-
structure that would reduce vehicle use.  More generally, state and federal 
transportation financing decisions have a significant impact on sprawl, 
 
 221. See id. at 65.  Powell responds to this concern by observing that, to address afford-
able housing needs, poor urban centers require the resources associated with mixed-income 
housing.  Id. at 66.  Support for higher-income housing is, in this analysis, necessary to im-
prove the well-being of the poor. 
 222. Cf. id. at 60 (explaining why inner-city communities have resisted regional govern-
ment). 
 223. See Williams, supra note 144, at 82-85. 
 224. See EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 141 (describing impact of local tax policy on 
affordable housing with consequent impacts on commute distances). 
 225. See Williams, supra note 144, at 84-87 (describing how highway decisions impact 
future growth patterns). 
 226. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, at 34-35. 
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since the creation of new highways can attract and enable sprawling 
growth.227  Federal transportation bills also continue to provide signifi-
cantly more funding for highways than for public transportation.228  Al-
though some federal transportation and environmental programs have at-
tempted to encourage greater coordination between transportation 
financing, VMT, and land use planning, they have not fundamentally re-
formed the role of transportation infrastructure financing in increasing 
sprawl.229 
Federal tax policies have also indirectly impacted suburban sprawl and 
consumption.  Since federal bank guarantees and the federal mortgage de-
duction lower the effective cost of housing purchases, they have made lar-
ger homes more affordable and generated more demand for large suburban 
single-family homes.230 
Although cities have a central role to play in reducing demand and its 
associated emissions, and although many cities have initiated their own 
climate change initiatives, existing obstacles to local action will prevent 
many cities from realizing their full potential to reduce consumer demand. 
 
 227. See Bartholomew, supra note 48, at 165-70. 
 228. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, at 35.  The federal government provides up to 
80% of the cost of new highways, and 90% of the cost for improvements and maintenance.  
Id.  Federal transit money, in contrast, is provided through a time-consuming competitive 
process and, if provided, generally provides no more than 60% of the cost.  Id.  Local gov-
ernments must often provide the remaining 40% or more for public transportation projects.  
Id. 
 229. For example, recent federal transportation legislation, beginning with the Intermodal 
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (“ISTEA”), has encouraged regional trans-
portation planning organizations to consider land use implications, modes of transit in addi-
tion to cars, and the environmental implications of highway infrastructure.  See Bartholo-
mew, supra note 48.  In addition, the federal Clean Air Act requires that transportation plans 
and projects in areas that have not attained air quality standards must “conform” to the at-
tainment plan established in the region and cannot lead to increases in VMT that would 
worsen air quality.  See Arnold W. Reitze, Air Quality Protection Using State Implementa-
tion Plans - Thirty-Seven Years of Increasing Complexity, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 292-97 
(2004) (describing the Clean Air Act’s evolving conformity provisions).  In this volume, 
Professor Bartholomew describes how these programs have failed to provide a sufficient 
brake on sprawl-inducing transportation investments and their limits as mechanisms for re-
forming local land use planning on a broad scale.  See Bartholomew, supra note 48, at 191-
205 (describing transportation legislation’s limits, describing the Clean Air Act’s confor-
mity analysis limitations, and summing up existing laws’ insufficiency). 
 230. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, at 37; John C. Dernbach & Scott Bernstein, Pur-
suing Sustainable Communities:  Looking Back, Looking Forward, 35 URB. LAW. 496, 505 
(2003); Ziegler, supra note 16, at 36 (noting the role of mortgage guarantees and deductions 
in promoting new home purchases and enabling sprawl). 
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V.  VERTICAL INTEGRATION:  LOCAL ACTION IN A FEDERAL, STATE, 
AND REGIONAL CONTEXT 
The obstacles described above suggest that federal or state requirements 
will be necessary to promote local action.  Ultimately, as a growing number 
of scholars have recognized, effective federal climate change policy must 
consider and integrate initiatives at the federal, state, regional, and local 
level.231  At the same time, the advantages of local control argue for pro-
viding local governments with a significant (though not unbounded) degree 
of autonomy in implementing federal or state requirements. 
The land use and transportation context presents a particularly difficult 
federalism challenge.  Federal or state mandates will be essential to over-
come local parochialism,232 but a local or regional role is simultaneously 
essential on both a practical and political level.  In the buildings context, 
the federalism issues remain important, but are somewhat less delicate.  
Minimum federal standards for residential and commercial buildings are 
more feasible than federally dictated land use requirements since they are 
less sensitive to local community values and needs.  They could also pro-
vide an advantage to national developers by reducing the multiplicity of 
standards that currently prevail.  While the discussion below does not ex-
plicitly differentiate between the land use and buildings context, specific 
provisions in federal legislation may well treat the two areas differently. 
A. Federal Legislation and State Implementation Planning 
As this Article and others have proposed, federal climate change legisla-
tion should include a variant on the state implementation plan process cur-
rently included in the existing federal Clean Air Act.233  Under this verti-
 
 231. See Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 84; Kaswan, Cooperative Federalism, supra 
note 81; Osofsky, Climate Legislation in Context, supra note 167, at 247 (“Climate change 
is a multiscalar problem that demands multiscalar solutions.”); Osofsky & Levit, The Scale 
of Networks, supra note 183; Thomas D. Peterson et al., Developing a Comprehensive Ap-
proach to Climate Change Policy in the United States that Fully Integrates Levels of Gov-
ernment and Economic Sectors, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 227 (2008); Stewart, supra note 142, at 
701 (noting that generic national measures “must be carefully linked with functionally re-
lated local regulatory programs . . . and institutional arrangements”); see also Buzbee, supra 
note 53, at 103-07 (suggesting that a vertically integrated approach involving federal, state, 
and local governments is necessary to address sprawl); Dernbach & Bernstein, supra note 
230, at 509 (observing that sustainable communities cannot be achieved by local action 
alone, but require supportive state and federal policies). 
 232. See Shelby D. Green, The Search for a National Land Use Policy:  For the Cities’ 
Sake, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 69, 72 (1998) (noting that some scholars advocate a national 
land use policy to overcome local decisions that fail to consider regional impacts). 
 233. Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 84; Kaswan, Cooperative Federalism, supra no-
te 81; Peterson et al., supra note 231, at 264.  Other federal laws impose state planning re-
KASWAN_AUTHOR_APPROVAL 2/20/2009  5:21:10 PM 
2009] CLIMATE CHANGE, CONSUMPTION, AND CITIES 297 
cally-integrated approach, federal legislation would establish federal re-
quirements, parameters, and oversight while decentralizing those imple-
mentation decisions that are best executed at a state or local level.234  As a 
first step, the legislation would require the EPA to identify the GHG emis-
sions reductions to be achieved at the state or local level and then allocate 
responsibility for achieving those reductions among the states.235  For ex-
 
quirements and could provide a model for climate change legislation.  For example, the 
Coastal Zone Management Act supports state land use planning and gives states a variety of 
options for engaging in such planning or delegating planning responsibilities to more local 
jurisdictions.  See Green, supra note 232, at 107-08 (describing statute’s planning ap-
proach). 
 234. Peterson et al., supra note 231, at 264.  Since the federal government does not have 
the constitutional authority to impose direct duties upon states and other subnational entities, 
see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), federal legislation that imposed re-
sponsibilities on state and local governments would have to be carefully designed to avoid 
constitutional limitations.  As in the Clean Air Act, the federal government could condition 
federal funding, like transportation funds, on performance of the legislation’s requirements, 
or give states the option of having the federal government perform the required planning and 
regulation instead.  See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 100-02 (discussing the impact of constitu-
tional constraints on potential federal efforts to address sprawl); id. at 107-24 (describing the 
possible use of conditional federal funding to control sprawl). 
In the early 1970s, Congress considered but failed to adopt a federal land use law that 
would have required states to engage in land use planning on their own or in cooperation 
with local governments.  See Green, supra note 232, at 117-18.  The legislation recognized 
the broad impact of local decisions and was intended to ensure that local governments did 
not undermine regional well-being.  Id. 
 235. See Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 84, at 823; Kaswan, Cooperative Federal-
ism, supra note 81, at 836; McKinstry et al., supra note 122, at 7-8; Peterson et al., supra 
note 231, at 260.  Peterson, McKinstry, and Dernbach suggest that any reductions that 
would not be achieved through national technology-based standards or a national cap-and-
trade program should be allocated to the states and addressed through a state implementa-
tion planning process.  Peterson et al., supra note 231, at 264. 
The issue of how to allocate emission reduction responsibilities among the states, particu-
larly in light of the significant disparities in emissions among the states, will present a sig-
nificant challenge.  The disparities do not necessarily represent differences in per capita us-
age, since some states generate energy (and emissions) on behalf of others.  See Kaswan, 
Cooperative Federalism, supra note 81, at 836-37 (discussing issues likely to arise in de-
termining each state’s reduction responsibility). 
The European Union is planning on taking a similar approach for the third phase of its cli-
mate change program, slated to begin in 2013.  Emissions amenable to control through a 
European-wide cap-and-trade system, comprising approximately 45% of Europe’s emis-
sions, will be handled through a centralized system.  See LARRY PARKER, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE:  THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME (ETS) GETS READY FOR 
KYOTO 1 (2007); COMM’N OF THE EUR. COMMUNITIES, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMIS-
SION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE, AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 7 (2008), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LesUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0030:FIN:EN:PDF. Responsibility for the re-
maining emissions will be delegated to each nation within the European Union.  Id.  Each 
nation state is then responsible for developing an emission reduction plan for the non-
trading sector.  Id. 
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ample, reductions that could be achieved through VMT reductions or en-
hanced building standards could be assigned to the states.236  Relevant as-
pects of the state implementation process could then be further devolved to 
the regional or local metropolitan level, which could develop demand-
reduction and other emission-reducing policies over sources within their 
control.237  The state would then consolidate planned state, regional, and 
local efforts into a state implementation plan subject to federal oversight.238 
Below, I highlight a few of the many institutional issues that implement-
ing a SIP-like process would raise:  (1) the division of responsibility be-
tween states and more local levels; (2) devolution to regional agencies ver-
sus local governments; and (3) the extent to which certain types of land use 
or buildings measures should be mandated or left to state and local discre-
tion. 
B. The Division of Responsibility Between the State and Local Level 
The states must first set the ground rules for regional or local land use 
and building reforms.  For example, they could establish parameters for the 
types of zoning that are likely to reduce VMT and limit local discretion to 
 
It is possible that determining each state’s obligation would be so deeply contested as to 
paralyze the process.  Alternatively, federal legislation could focus on policies and measures 
that each state is required to adopt, rather than setting state-specific emission-reduction tar-
gets. 
 236. Determining the reductions attributable to the national government and those attrib-
utable to the state and local level will present important challenges given the potential over-
lap among the categories.  For example, a national policy could address reductions from the 
nation’s utilities, with the expectation that national requirements would be met through a 
combination of technology improvements, fuel-switching, investment in alternative fuels, 
and utility-driven demand management strategies.  Utilities’ emissions, however, will also 
be impacted by state and local demand-reduction measures, like building standards.  Thus, 
conceivably, a national emissions goal for utilities should assume, and subtract, the emis-
sions reductions to be achieved through state and local initiatives.  See McKinstry et al., su-
pra note 122, at 5.  It is also possible that the full emission reduction targets could be allo-
cated to the states, who would then incorporate into their implementation plans not only 
their own efforts, but also federal programs contributing to their efforts.  That approach 
would be similar to the Clean Air Act, which requires states to meet the National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards, but assumes that progress toward the standards will be achieved 
through both state controls and federal programs such as the federal requirements on sta-
tionary sources and automobiles. 
 237. In addition to demand-reduction policies, localities could reduce emissions from 
municipal operations, including those from municipal buildings, vehicle fleets, and landfills, 
and facilitate renewable energy sources.  See, e.g., Healy, supra note 148, at 421. 
 238. Legislators may want to consider federal oversight models that are somewhat less 
burdensome than the existing oversight over state implementation plans under the Clean Air 
Act, which requires federal approval of every change. 
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adopt sprawl-inducing ordinances and engage in exclusionary zoning.239  
States could also indirectly impact the factors that lead municipalities to 
zone for sprawl by providing local governments with greater resources to 
finance essential services, such as schools, and by reducing local govern-
ments’ financial reliance on property taxes.240  States’ transportation poli-
cies could foster compact development and public transit to disfavor 
sprawl.  On the buildings front, states could adopt more stringent minimum 
energy codes and provide financing for local energy efficiency efforts. 
But statewide measures can go only so far.  After adopting appropriate 
reforms at the state level, the states should delegate specific emission-
reduction responsibilities to each metropolitan region241 and allow individ-
ual regions and cities to adopt and implement the land use and buildings 
policies necessary to meet the state-set targets.  The state would then over-
see and approve local implementation plans to ensure regional and local 
compliance.242 
Devolution from the state to the local level is appropriate in light of the 
unique advantages of local control.243  As discussed above, municipal land 
use patterns are key causes of GHG emissions, and  local entities are well 
positioned to address them in light of their existing land use authority, their 
knowledge of local circumstances and opportunities, their ability to include 
 
 239. Professor Levine observes that commentators concerned about municipalities’ fail-
ure to engage in smart growth frequently focus only on regional regulation rather than ad-
dressing states limitations on municipalities’ ability to preclude dense development.  LE-
VINE, supra note 32, at 43. 
 240. See id. at 74-75.  If local governments were less dependent upon property taxes, they 
could be more likely to allow denser development and more affordable housing. 
 241. Determining the appropriate emissions budget for each locality is likely to be as dif-
ficult as determining the appropriate emissions budget for each state.  See SALON & SPER-
LING, supra note 203, at 5-6 (evaluating several options for determining local budgets). 
To address the connection between land use, VMT, and GHG emissions, California recently 
passed legislation that will require the California Air Resources Board to establish regional 
emission reduction targets for transportation. S.B. 375 § 4, 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2008) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65080(b)(2)(A) (West 2008)).  Each region will be 
required to develop a Sustainable Communities Strategy that outlines the development and 
land use patterns it will use to achieve the required reductions.  Id. 
 242. States have adopted similar approaches to address other local decisions with state-
wide implications.  For example, California requires cities and counties to adopt general 
plans that address their fair share of regional housing need.  See DIV. OF HOUS. POL’Y DEV., 
CAL. DEP’T OF HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., STATE HOUSING ELEMENT LAW, http://www.hcd.ca. 
gov/hpd/hrc/plan/he/heoverview.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2008).  The state identifies each 
region’s share of the state’s housing need and allocates that share to a regional planning or-
ganization.  The planning organization develops a plan that in turn allocates the regional 
need to the region’s cities and counties.  The California Department of Housing and Com-
munity Development ultimately reviews each local general plan.  Id. 
 243. See Briffault, supra note 167, at 1168 (arguing that key land use decisions should be 
made at the regional rather than the state level). 
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the participation of and be accountable to the citizens who will be affected 
by any adopted measures, and the benefit of allowing a diversity of ap-
proaches that could be models (good and bad) for other jurisdictions to fol-
low (or avoid).244  By distributing the duty to reduce emissions, a state 
would also be more likely to distribute the co-benefits of GHG emission 
reductions, such as reductions in air pollution.245  Moreover, as a political 
matter, legislation to improve land use planning is unlikely to succeed if it 
strips local governments of their historic powers.246  The practical chal-
lenges of tracking, coordinating, and guiding local action at the federal and 
state levels are outweighed by the benefits that local control could offer.247  
The critical issue of local governments’ political will to reform—and the 
implications for the necessary balance between mandate and discretion—is 
discussed below. 
California recently adopted legislation that could provide a national 
model.  In order to encourage statewide reductions in VMT and increase 
incentives for land use reforms, the legislation requires the California Air 
Resources Board to set a statewide goal for reducing VMT-generated ve-
hicular emissions and then set regional reduction targets that distribute re-
sponsibility to each of California’s municipal areas.248  Metropolitan Plan-
ning Organizations (“MPOs”) in each region, already tasked with 
transportation planning responsibilities, will be required to develop a Sus-
tainable Communities Strategy that outlines the regional development and 
land use patterns that would achieve the required reductions.249  Califor-
nia’s law suggests the potential viability of state-delegated VMT-reduction 
obligations. 
In the buildings context, devolution from the state to local level may be 
less imperative.  As discussed above, building standards implicate fewer 
local socioeconomic and political considerations than land use provisions, 
and statewide consistency may have a greater value than in the land use 
context.  Nonetheless, even if a state chooses to enact strict statewide build-
ing standards, local governments could be given the option of meeting re-
gional or local greenhouse reduction goals through enhanced local stan-
 
 244. See generally Griffith, supra note 102, at 1030-31 (describing the benefits of local 
implementation of smart growth initiatives in light of local expertise and accountability). 
 245. Kaswan, Environmental Justice, supra note 85, at 10302. 
 246. See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 103-04 (observing that federalism norms favoring lo-
cal power are a “political reality”). 
 247. See Stewart, supra note 142, at 701. 
 248. S.B. 375 § 4, 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 
65080(b)(2)(A) (West 2008)). 
 249. Id. 
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dards.250  Local governments required to meet local emission reduction 
goals could appreciate the flexibility of choosing from an array of land use 
and buildings strategies. 
C. Devolution to the Regional or Local Level? 
A critical and controversial issue for any planning strategy is the relative 
role of regional entities and local governments.  At least with respect to the 
land use and transportation components of a state’s emission reduction 
strategy, a regional planning role appears imperative.251  Initial emission-
reduction obligations could be delegated to regional entities, who could 
work with local governments and citizens to engage in a regional land use 
planning effort that sets regional goals and establishes a general blueprint 
for channeling regional growth and meeting regional needs.252  California’s 
SB 375 has taken this approach by requiring the implementing state agency 
to assign transportation-emission reduction obligations and associated 
planning responsibilities to regional MPOs, entities that already engage in 
transportation planning.253 
Regional planning would combat localities’ tendency to serve parochial 
rather than regional interests and allow for a more rational approach to the 
inevitable spillover effects of local decisions in interconnected regions.254  
Particularly in the land use context, local decisions have regional im-
pacts.255  One suburb’s decision to allow low-density sprawling develop-
 
 250. Cf. CPUC PLAN, supra note 74, at 82 (stating that local governments could help 
achieve energy efficiency by developing building codes that exceed the state’s already-strict 
energy code).  On the importance of not preempting stricter state and local standards, see 
William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation:  Risk, Preemption, and the Floor Ceiling 
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007) [hereinafter Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation]; 
Kaswan, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 81, at 798-803. 
 251. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 102, at 1019 (arguing for a regional approach to 
achieve smart growth). 
 252. This approach is similar to the “blueprint” planning process underway in the Sacra-
mento region, see supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text, and to the planning process 
for VMT reduction established by S.B. 375.  See supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
 253. See Darrel Steinberg, SB 375 Connects Land Use and AB 32 Implementation, PLAN. 
REP., July 2007, available at http://www.planningreport.com/tpr/?module= 
displaystory&story_id=1257&edition_id=92&format=html. 
 254. See Briffault, supra note 167, at 1132-33, 1164 (arguing that local government deci-
sions have spillover impacts that local governments fail to consider); Buzbee, supra note 53, 
at 91 (observing that, although local governments make land use choices, “sprawl arises out 
of dynamics, causes, and effects that tend, at a minimum, to be regional”); Griffith, supra 
note 102, at 1026-27 (describing regional nature of sprawl).  See also Steinberg, supra note 
253 (quoting the S.B. 375’s author’s statement that “we need to plan as a region, not just as 
individual cities and counties” due to the regional nature of air quality, congestion, and cli-
mate change concerns). 
 255. See Briffault, supra note 167, at 1133-36. 
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ment creates congestion in neighboring communities while forcing new de-
velopment ever farther from the metropolitan core.  Suburban zoning deci-
sions that preclude affordable housing force low-paid workers to commute 
long distances to suburban employment centers.  Fundamentally, given the 
flow of residents between local communities as they travel between work, 
home, and school, individual municipalities do not have control over the 
overarching land use and transit patterns that impact VMT.  In addition, a 
regional approach could reduce competition between communities within a 
region, lessening the race to the bottom and the fear of leakage that could 
otherwise impede desirable local action.  As a practical matter, public 
transportation systems are likely to be more effective if developed on a 
comprehensive regional basis than on a municipal basis.256  As note above, 
California could provide a partial model for regional planning to reduce 
VMT:  the state recently enacted legislation that assigns VMT-reduction 
targets to metropolitan regions and requires regional MPOs, already estab-
lished for transportation planning purposes, to develop an overarching re-
gional land use plan.257 
While regional planning is necessary to address the regional conse-
quences of local land use decisions, creating fair and effective regional 
governance poses numerous challenges.  At present, regional planning enti-
ties generally have little direct authority; cities retain primary control over 
basic land use and transportation decisions.258  Unless regional entities are 
given greater power, they risk expending significant resources in planning 
efforts that could ultimately fail to be implemented by the local govern-
ments who have actual authority.259 
Giving regional entities full land use power or creating regional govern-
ments is, however, highly controversial and is unlikely to be implemented 
given the political opposition of local governments to ceding governing au-
thority.260  Conceivably, however, climate change legislation could give 
 
 256. See Griffith, supra note 102, at 1026. 
 257. See Steinberg, supra note 253; see also supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text. 
 258. See SALON & SPERLING, supra note 203, at 4. 
 259. In light of these concerns, Deborah Salon and Daniel Sperling have proposed allo-
cating carbon emissions budgets to cities and giving each city the discretion to determine 
how best to meet its budget.  See id. at 4.  In contrast, a regional planning effort in Sacra-
mento, California appears to be successfully translating regional plans into local government 
implementation actions.  See Sacramento Region Blueprint, http://www.sacregionblueprint 
.org/sacregionblueprint/home.cfm (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).  Local governments in the 
Sacramento context may have been inspired to participate by projections that, without the 
regional controls, congestion and air quality would become even more severe than the ad-
verse conditions already experienced.  See Campoy, supra note 187, at A1. 
 260. See Briffault, supra note 167, at 1149, 1165. The League of California Cities ini-
tially opposed S.B. 375 due to its impact on local control, see Steinberg, supra note 253, but 
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general planning authority to a regional entity but then empower the re-
gional entity to further assign emission-reduction obligations to the local 
level.261  Local governments would then develop more refined city-specific 
land use, buildings, and other strategies to meet their local targets.  As dis-
cussed further below, regional governments should be given sufficient 
mechanisms, whether incentives or penalties, to induce local governments 
to follow the regionally-established land use, transportation, and buildings 
parameters and to meet their local targets.262  Although this approach 
would necessarily diminish local government prerogatives, such diminish-
ment is necessary to achieve critical land use reforms. 
As regional institutions become increasingly powerful, with increased 
planning responsibilities and enhanced authority to induce local compli-
ance, they must ensure democratic accountability through adequate repre-
sentation of affected populations and vigorous public participation re-
quirements.263  Regional entities have not always met these goals.  For 
example, in the transportation planning context, MPOs that give an equal 
vote to each municipality, regardless of size, provide suburban interests 
with a disproportionate role relative to the population and interests they 
represent.264  The views of a large central city could be outweighed by the 
 
ultimately endorsed the bill. See League of California Cities, Issues & Legislation, 
http://www.cacities.org/index.jsp?displaytype=11&story=27392&zone=locc&section=issue
s&sub_sec=issues_enviro&tert=issues_enviro_cominfo# (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). 
  Scholars have vigorously debated the value and potential shape of regional institu-
tions.  See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 167.  A full exploration of the issue is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 261. See generally Briffault, supra note 167, at 1165-66 (advocating for a regional ap-
proach to land use that would nonetheless honor the “subsidiarity” principle, in which deci-
sions would be left to local governments wherever possible). 
 262. See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 194 (describing incentives that regional entities could 
use to induce local governments to permit compact development).  S.B. 375 includes carrots 
to induce local government compliance.  The MPO’s transportation planning and funding 
decisions must be consistent with the sustainable communities strategy (“SCS”), and so in-
consistent transportation projects would not receive funding.  In addition, development pro-
jects consistent with the SCS are entitled to streamlined environmental reviews.  See Memo-
randum from Bill Higgins, Legislative Representative & Sr. Staff Attorney, to California 
City Officials 12-13 (Sep. 19, 2008), available at http://cacities.org/resource_files/27223. 
SB%20375%20Implementation%20Final%209-19-08(1.1).pdf.  It remains to be seen, how-
ever, whether these carrots will be sufficient to induce local governments to engage in land 
use planning that is consistent with the SCS.  Stronger incentives, like conditioning addi-
tional sources of federal funding or state approvals on compliance with the SCS, may be 
necessary. 
 263. Some regionalism advocates propose that regional entities be representative, elected, 
bodies rather than agencies staffed by appointed officials.  See Briffault, supra note 167, at 
1166-67; Griffith, supra note 102, at 1031-34. 
 264. Pursuant to federal transportation statutes, MPOs in many urban regions engage in 
comprehensive regional transit planning.  See Thomas W. Sanchez & James F. Wolf, Envi-
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multiple representatives of many small suburban communities, even if the 
city represents a much larger population than the suburban areas.  Regional 
institutions responsible for developing an emission reduction blueprint 
must ensure that they adequately represent and are accountable to the af-
fected populations, and not simply the affected local governments.  As dis-
cussed further below, regional entities also need to incorporate broad public 
participation provisions to ensure input, particularly from groups who have 
historically been underrepresented in land use decision-making proc-
esses.265 
D. Mandates or Discretion? 
The state implementation planning process under the Clean Air Act, 
while certainly not unfettered, has left states with considerable discretion in 
how to meet air quality standards, particularly with respect to land use con-
trol measures.  Most states have not chosen to reduce emissions through 
land use control efforts.266  That deficit is likely attributable to the myriad 
economic, political, and social obstacles to local smart growth and other 
green initiatives discussed above.  If states and local governments are left 
with full discretion, these obstacles are likely to continue to impede change. 
Federal law should therefore mandate that states require local or regional 
institutions to meet their emission reduction obligations through land use 
and other demand reduction efforts.267  At the same time, imposing precon-
 
ronmental Justice and Transportation Equity:  A Review of MPOs, in GROWING SMARTER, 
supra note 220, at 249, 251.  The MPOs generally include one representative of each local 
government within the metropolitan area, giving more weight (in relation to population) to 
suburban communities than to core cities.  Id. at 255, 265.  As a consequence, suburbs, 
which are generally whiter and richer than core cities, have a greater voice in establishing 
regional transportation plans than urban centers.  See Robert D. Bullard, Smart Growth 
Meets Environmental Justice, in GROWING SMARTER, supra note 220, at 35-36. 
 265. See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 96-98; see infra notes 294-300 and accompanying text 
(discussing importance of participation in regional decisionmaking entities). 
 266. See Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 84, at 829-30; see also EWING ET AL., supra 
note 13, at 136 (observing that “land use and transportation demand management policies 
generally have not played a significant role in meeting” local air pollution reduction goals).  
In light of its extreme air pollution, San Joaquin County is one of the few areas in the coun-
try to have incorporated land use measures in its SIP.  See Carolyn Whetzel, San Joaquin 
Valley Air District Adopts Rules to Cut Pollution from Developers, Wineries, 36 ENV’T REP. 
2653 (2005).  Developers of large new projects must incorporate land use or building design 
strategies to reduce emissions or pay mitigation fees that would be used to fund other air 
pollution reduction activities.  Id. 
 267. See Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 84, at 829; cf. Salkin, supra note 20, at 825 
(suggesting that states may need to mandate intergovernmental cooperation in order to over-
come “strong home rule cultures in many jurisdictions”).  Professor William Buzbee in-
sightfully analyzes the political issues raised by varying levels of mandate and discretion in 
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ceived and inflexible requirements on regional and local governments 
would eliminate all the advantages of local government knowledge, fail to 
adjust to the significant differences among localities, eliminate the democ-
ratic advantages of local control, and deprive the nation of the opportunity 
to explore a variety of approaches.268  It is also likely to create a strong po-
litical backlash.269  Without attempting to draw the line between mandate 
and discretion, it is clear that some combination of the two will be neces-
sary. 
Mandates to eliminate sprawl-inducing zoning provisions and promote 
more compact development may raise the specter of government run amok, 
forcing unwanted change on individuals and interfering with the housing 
market.  While it is true that mandates would interfere with local govern-
ments’ exclusionary zoning, studies suggest that eliminating low-density 
zoning requirements and allowing more compact development would better 
serve consumer demand for more compact communities,270 demand that is 
now frustrated by existing zoning restrictions.271  A survey of developers 
has found that they believe there is a strong market for compact develop-
ment and that local zoning limitations prevent them from building to their 
desired density.272  From a regional perspective, then, “interfering” with 
existing local land use laws may help overcome systemic barriers that have 
poorly served much of the population. 
VI.  A COMPREHENSIVE SOCIOECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAND USE 
Just as no single level of government can, by itself, revolutionize urban 
form, an exclusive focus on urban form will not succeed in addressing the 
underlying causes of sprawl.273  The essential land use planning ahead can-
not focus solely on mechanical increases in density and rolling out the next 
 
federal programs designed to induce state and local action through conditional federal 
spending.  See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 117-24. 
 268. See supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text (describing advantages of local con-
trol). 
 269. See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 124 (observing that strict requirements that could re-
sult in sanctions are likely to be politically unpopular); Salkin, supra note 20, at 814 (noting 
that “purely regulatory solutions to planning and development problems” generate “strong 
opposition”); see also SALON & SPERLING, supra note 203, at 11 (observing that local gov-
ernments should be provided with “carrots” rather than “sticks” so that they become part-
ners rather than adversaries). 
 270. See EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 23-27. 
 271. See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 51-53 (describing limits imposed by existing zoning). 
 272. Id. at 127-28 (describing developer interest in compact development and their per-
ception that municipal regulations impede such development). 
 273. See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 60 (arguing that sprawl cannot be successfully abated 
without addressing its social, market, and legal causes). 
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bus line: it must take into account the associated sociopolitical and cultural 
dimensions of the challenge.  An integrated planning process would recog-
nize land use policy as social policy, and, to the extent possible, explicitly 
incorporate and address demand-reduction policies’ socioeconomic impli-
cations and potential.274  Such an approach is necessary not only to ensure 
the success of VMT reduction; climate change-driven land use reforms cre-
ate an opportunity to address underlying inequities and dysfunctions in the 
land use system. 
The emerging regional equity movement provides a roadmap for com-
prehensive urban development that integrates environmental, economic, 
and social parameters.  The movement advocates reducing “disparities in 
transportation, housing, economic opportunity, land use, infrastructure, 
education, environmental justice, and health.”275  Similar goals have been 
articulated as part of the “smart growth” movement,276 as well as in the sus-
tainable development literature focused on sustainable communities.277 
A. The Importance of Socioeconomic Factors in Achieving VMT 
Reductions 
As noted above, current land use patterns are, in part, a consequence of 
past and present discrimination.  The legacy of separation cannot be over-
come without addressing the underlying social and economic causes of the 
 
 274. Urban development legislation has attempted to encourage integrated planning, but 
has often failed to achieve its goals.  See Green, supra note 232, at 112-13 (describing, for 
example, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970); see also Salsich, supra note 
207, at 487-90 (discussing federal housing and community development laws that encour-
aged comprehensive equity-based land use planning as a precondition to receiving grant 
money).  Some communities have undertaken such integrated planning on their own.  See 
Dernbach & Bernstein, supra note 230, at 503 (describing local sustainable development 
planning initiatives that integrated a wide variety of socioeconomic, environmental, and par-
ticipatory concerns). 
 275. See Robert D. Bullard, Introduction, in GROWING SMARTER, supra note 220, at 1, 5; 
see also ANGELA GLOVER BLACKWELL & SARAH TREUHAFT, REGIONAL EQUITY AND THE 
QUEST FOR FULL INCLUSION 2 (2008), available at http://www.policylink.org/Events/ 
documents/FramingPaper08.pdf. 
 276. See Salkin, supra note 20, at 789-90 (listing the American Planning Association’s 
description of smart growth, which incorporates environmental and economic factors, in-
cluding the need for greater equity).  Notwithstanding the American Planning Association’s 
inclusive definition of smart growth, some have critiqued the movement for focusing pri-
marily on environmental issues with little consideration of racial and social equity.  See Bul-
lard, supra note 275, at 3; see also Salkin, supra note 20, at 825 (stating that affordable 
housing and “social equity must be a bigger part of the smart growth discussion”). 
 277. See Dernbach & Bernstein, supra note 230, at 495-99. 
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urban/suburban divide.278  Professor Roisman stresses the importance of 
continuing efforts to address racial and economic bias.279 
More concretely, sprawl is unlikely to be mitigated, and central cities 
unlikely to be repopulated with middle- and upper-income residents, unless 
urban services improve.280  For example, middle- and upper-income fami-
lies are unlikely to move to the central city without profound improvements 
in school quality.281  That raises a “chicken and egg” problem:  without 
wealthier residents and businesses, cities cannot afford to improve services, 
but without the improved services, they cannot attract revenue-generating 
residents and businesses.  Federal, state, and regional strategies to promote 
infill development to reduce emissions thus need to consider not only their 
immediate objectives, but a broader socioeconomic agenda that addresses 
the resources deficit in struggling urban centers.282 
While improving urban services to encourage middle-class infill is criti-
cal, infill policies that simply displace poor residents would be counterpro-
ductive from both a social justice and VMT-reduction perspective.  Infill 
policies focused on adding new housing rather than replacing existing 
housing are less likely to pose this risk. 
Socioeconomic considerations are critical to the development path 
within suburbs as well as cities.  For example, to alleviate the long com-
mutes of lower-paid workers in suburban settings, VMT-reduction strate-
gies must address the lack of affordable housing in suburbs.283  Policies 
that not only encourage greater infill and density, but also include afforda-
bility requirements, could enable low-wage workers to live closer to em-
ployment centers.  In order to induce suburbs to give up exclusionary zon-
ing, states will have to address the system of financing local services that 
drives exclusionary fiscal zoning.284 
 
 278. See supra notes 203-22 and accompanying text. 
 279. See Roisman, supra note 105, at 112. 
 280. See id. 
 281. As Professor Bullard notes, school quality plays a central role in family locational 
decisions.  Bullard, supra note 264, at 33. 
 282. A full elaboration of possible strategies is beyond the scope of this Article.  Meas-
ures could, however, include state or federal requirements that local jurisdictions share a 
greater portion of their tax revenue for regional or statewide purposes.  See Myron Orfield, 
Building Regional Coalitions Between Cities and Suburbs, in GROWING SMARTER, supra 
note 220, at 323, 325-31. 
 283. See Salsich, supra note 207, at 463-65 (observing that low-density single-use subur-
ban zoning presents a significant obstacle to the provision of affordable housing); id. at 498 
(noting that “the growing disparity between job opportunity and affordable housing avail-
ability is a matter of national concern”). 
 284. See supra notes 204-06, 239 and accompanying text. 
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B. Beyond Demand Management: Achieving Regional Equity 
Reducing VMT is not the only justification for incorporating regional 
equity goals into climate change policy.  Decisions to address emissions in-
evitably implicate a wide range of economic and social factors.  Addressing 
only one facet of a multi-faceted venture is simply poor decisionmaking.  
For example, in the land use context, increased VMT is only one of 
sprawl’s many adverse consequences.285  A holistic recognition of land use 
regulation’s impacts could lead to more productive and effective re-
forms.286  Climate change policies promoting land use reform could thus 
provide a vehicle for creating more effective and more equitable urban in-
frastructures that enhance municipal services, increase opportunities for the 
disadvantaged, and improve quality of life.287  Since these goals are consis-
tent with, and in some cases necessary to, the success of demand-reduction 
measures, the opportunity is one to be taken. 
While this is not the place to fully explore and defend the concept of re-
gional equity as an important component of land use policy, I note that 
scholars are increasingly recognizing that greater equity would benefit not 
only the urban underclass, but entire metropolitan regions.288  Contrary to 
the assumptions of some suburbanites that they have insulated themselves 
from the problems of the urban core, recent studies have shown that the 
economic, social, and environmental health of the suburbs often track the 
core’s well-being.289  The pursuit of regional equity is thus justified not 
only in redistributive terms, but as a mechanism for enhancing entire met-
ropolitan regions, both core and suburb. 
 
 285. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 53, at 69-75 (describing sprawl’s adverse conse-
quences); Ziegler, supra note 16, at 37-45 (same). 
 286. While some argue that the imperatives of climate change demand an exclusive focus 
on measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, I argue that climate change policies can 
and should address a broader agenda.  See Kaswan, Environmental Justice, supra note 85, at 
10287-88.  The regional equity movement calls for considering the equity impacts at the 
“front end” of political processes and ensuring “that disadvantaged communities participate 
in and benefit from decision that determine the course of development in their neighbor-
hoods, communities, and regions.”  BLACKWELL & TREUHAFT, supra note 275, at 2. 
 287. In addition, to the extent that policymakers question the wisdom of encouraging 
compact growth as a climate change strategy due to uncertainties as to its effectiveness in 
reducing VMT, see supra notes 42-66 and accompanying text, considerations like creating 
affordable housing near job centers and improving quality of life provide additional justifi-
cations for reforming land use policy.  See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 47-48, 185-86. 
 288. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 53, at 131 (arguing that all localities in a region ulti-
mately recognize the value of a municipal region that offers essential services). 
 289. See Briffault, supra note 167, at 1137-40; Roisman, supra note 105, at 90-96; pow-
ell, supra note 220, at 54. 
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An integrated approach is desirable from a practical as well as a theo-
retical perspective.  While integrated planning may appear more compli-
cated than single-issue planning, planning officials may find an integrated 
approach more, not less, efficient than a multiplicity of separately man-
dated, yet intrinsically interconnected planning exercises.  Emission reduc-
tion plans impacting urban form require decisions about the location of 
housing, workplaces, and infrastructure, decisions that are fundamentally 
interrelated.  Developing separate plans could lead to disjointed and ineffi-
cient results.290 
Regional equity goals can be integrated into land use planning efforts 
through a wide variety of mechanisms that both reduce environmental im-
pacts and address social equity considerations.291  Green building programs 
could also integrate regional equity goals by channeling employment op-
portunities to communities in need.  For example, they could develop green 
jobs programs that train unemployed residents to engage in energy effi-
ciency retrofits and weatherization.292 
C. Meaningful Participation 
A top-down requirement that relevant officials consider the full array of 
socioeconomic implications of land use and other climate policies is 
unlikely to be effective.293 A key attribute of local planning is its ability to 
include the participation of community members in planning efforts.294  
That participation risks, however, simply replicating the existing power 
structures within metropolitan areas.295  Federal or state legislation de-
signed to encourage smart growth measures should therefore include par-
 
 290. The League of California Cities lauded S.B. 375’s integration of land use, transpor-
tation, and housing planning, noting that it helped overcome the “long-standing issue” of 
“single-purpose state agencies.”  See Memorandum from Bill Higgins, supra note 262, at 3. 
 291. Blackwell and Treuhaft suggest such strategies as transit-oriented development, in-
clusionary zoning, and incentives to coordinate employment and affordable worker housing.  
See BLACKWELL & TREUHAFT, supra note 2755, at 3. 
 292. See id. at 7 (arguing that the “growing green economy” should be linked “to the re-
newal of low-income communities”); see also Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate 
Change:  A Climate Justice Proposal for a Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 
BUFF. L. REV.  169, 223-27 (discussing potential for green-collar jobs); Kaswan, Environ-
mental Justice, supra note 85, at 10311 (discussing the potential for domestic climate 
change policies to channel green development opportunities to disadvantaged communities). 
 293. See Dernbach & Bernstein, supra note 230, at 500. 
 294. See id. at 509 (describing importance of public participation). 
 295. See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 135. 
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ticipation requirements that will ensure sufficient representation of tradi-
tionally underprivileged groups in planning efforts.296 
The issue of devolving authority to regional versus local entities must 
also grapple with the socioeconomic implications of that choice.  Vesting 
authority in local entities could undermine change if suburban exclusionary 
impulses continue to govern and smart growth and affordable housing in-
centives are insufficient to overcome them.  A regional focus could have 
more potential to incorporate the interests of an entire region, including the 
urban core.  However, regional decision-making processes risk being 
overly insulated from public participation and control,297 or, alternatively, 
unequally representing the communities over which they have jurisdiction. 
Past regional transportation planning efforts have given suburban interests 
a proportionately greater voice.298  Regional planning efforts must therefore 
ensure sufficient participation to be responsive to the public, and be de-
signed to elicit the meaningful participation of groups that have historically 
been underrepresented in decision-making fora.299 
Achieving integrated planning thus requires climate change policymak-
ers developing VMT reduction or green building strategies to consider not 
only the mechanics of changing urban form, but broader considerations in-
cluding affordable housing, municipal services, transit equity, and mean-
ingful participatory structures.  The broader the goals, the broader the nec-
essary expertise, the broader the potentially affected constituencies, and the 
 
 296. As Professor Bullard has stated, “if poor people and people of color are not at the 
table when plans are developed or decisions are made, their interests may not be well 
served.”  Bullard, supra note 2644, at 25.  They therefore need a seat at the table, and they 
“must be heard and respected, and their vision must be acted on before real change takes 
hold.”  Id. at 25; see also BLACKWELL & TREUHAFT, supra note 2755, at 9 (emphasizing the 
importance of meaningful participation in decisionmaking). 
 297. See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 134 (stating that “[i]f democratically unaccountable 
regional authorities become the main venue for review of regional decisions influencing 
sprawl, the public’s voice is particularly likely to go unheard”). 
 298. In the transportation planning context, certain regional planning efforts have been 
plagued with concerns about the adequacy of community representation.  Pursuant to federal 
transportation statutes, MPOs in many urban regions engage in comprehensive regional 
transit planning.  See Sanchez & Wolf, supra note 264, at 251.  The MPOs generally include 
one representative of each local government within the metropolitan area, giving more 
weight (in relation to population) to suburban communities than to core cities.  Id. at 255, 
265.  As a consequence, suburbs, which are generally whiter and richer than core cities, 
have a greater voice in establishing regional transportation plans than urban centers.  See 
Bullard, supra note 2654, at 35-36; see also supra notes 264-2655 and accompanying text. 
 299. Ironically, such expectations could make regional approaches less politically viable.  
Those in power in particular local jurisdictions tend to resist new governance forms that 
could jeopardize that power.  See Griffith, supra note 102, at 1043 (noting that, in light of 
Atlanta’s racial politics and segregated structure, existing municipalities are unwilling to 
“cede power” to a regional government entity). 
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greater the potential for conflicts and tensions.  Unless there is sufficient 
local political pressure, state and local governments considering land use 
and other institutional changes may fail to incorporate regional equity goals 
in land use plans designed to reduce VMT.300  To achieve regional eq-
uity—or any other non-emission related goals—federal or state laws de-
signed to reduce VMT will need to include specific parameters that require 
local or state planning efforts to incorporate equity considerations.301 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, if federal climate change legislation continues to focus pri-
marily on smokestacks and tailpipes it will fail to address the underlying 
cause of most emissions:  consumption.  While federally-proposed market-
based mechanisms could indirectly induce some reductions in consump-
tion, the market is an imperfect tool for stimulating the necessary changes 
in the built environment.  To address consumption, the nation needs to di-
rectly address its land use and buildings policies. 
Cities can play a vital role in that process.  But notwithstanding the tre-
mendous surge in local climate change activity, with smart growth initia-
tives and green building ordinances abounding, reliance on piecemeal ur-
ban initiative is unlikely to be sufficient.  Federal climate legislation should 
create a vertically integrated framework for requiring states to take respon-
sibility for reducing statewide consumption and, as appropriate, delegating 
that responsibility to the regional or local level.  In light of the complexity 
of the political, economic, and social factors lying behind land use policy, 
federal legislation must also, to the extent possible, attend to the socioeco-
nomic preconditions for successful land use reform.  Finally, climate 
change legislation has its silver lining:  by re-opening fundamental institu-
tions, like urban structure, it provides an opportunity to integrate a regional 
equity approach that would not only reduce VMT, but redress the deeper 
ills that our sprawling legacy has produced. 
A single federal climate change bill is unlikely to incorporate all of the 
elements necessary to reform land use and building practices.  Rather, fed-
 
 300. Given power imbalances in some regions, it is quite conceivable that the poor and 
disadvantaged who would most benefit from regional equity principles would be the least 
politically powerful, and the least able to incorporate such goals in planning efforts. 
 301. Local and regional institutions could work with and draw upon the civic organiza-
tions attempting to integrate environmental, social justice, and sustainability concerns.  Such 
organizations include, for example, the Apollo Alliance, a coalition of business, labor, and 
environmental groups promoting green jobs, and Policy Link, a national institute advancing 
economic and social equity.  See generally Apollo Alliance, http://apolloalliance.org/ (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2009); Welcome to PolicyLink, http://www.policylink.org (last visited Jan. 
23, 2009). 
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eral and state laws addressing transportation,302 tax structures,303 commu-
nity development,304 schools, affordable housing, and appliance and build-
ing energy standards305 may all play a role in encouraging the proposed 
land use and building changes.  Moreover, state laws governing utilities,306 
land-use planning,307 and the relative power of regional versus local gov-
ernments are critical.308  Notwithstanding the complexity of these compo-
nent parts, federal climate change legislation that recognizes the critical 
role of consumption—and the importance of redirecting land use and build-
ing policies to reduce consumption—would set the nation on a more realis-
tic course toward achieving its climate change goals. 
 
 302. For example, the federal government’s transportation programs could re-orient 
transportation funding from highways to transit, see BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, at 48-49, 
include performance standards and incentives to reduce VMT, and set standards for locali-
ties to qualify for federal transportation funding.  See Bartholomew, supra note 48; Buzbee, 
supra note 53, at 125-26; see also EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 130-36. 
 303. Tax policies could create tax credits or deductions for energy efficiency improve-
ments.  See Dernbach, supra note 2, at 10018-19.  As discussed above, states could consider 
more equitable financing of local services to reduce the incentives to engage in exclusionary 
zoning.  See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
 304. On the community development front, the National League of Cities has proposed 
federal community block grants to further energy efficiency and smart growth efforts in dis-
advantaged communities that are unlikely to have sufficient capital.  National League of Cit-
ies, Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant, http://www.nlc.org (search “energy 
efficiency and conservation block grant”) (last visited Jan 23, 2009). 
 305. Such efforts would include not only the standards themselves, but mechanisms to 
facilitate consumer access to information about appliance and building energy use, informa-
tion that would enhance the efficacy of market-based approaches.  See Dernbach, Harness-
ing Individual Behavior, supra note 10, at 147-49 
 306. Utilities would have a greater incentive to invest in demand-management programs 
if utility profits were decoupled from energy generation, see supra note 114 and accompa-
nying text, if alternative rate structures were designed to encourage conservation, and if 
utilities were permitted to invest directly in energy efficiency measures, especially for poor 
residents, rather than investing in power plants. 
 307. States whose land use laws preclude smart growth zoning could revise state law to 
allow or encourage sprawl-constraining land use reforms.  See Dernbach & Bernstein, supra 
note 230, at 520 (suggesting reform); id. at 511 (noting that some states’ zoning laws require 
local governments to engage in single-use zoning).  Many, but not all, states have already 
adopted such reforms.  See id. at 511-12; see also Salkin, supra note 20, at 790-821 (de-
scribing state smart growth programs); id. at 835-36 (describing potential state measures to 
encourage local smart growth). 
 308. See Dernbach & Bernstein, supra note 230, at 520; see also EWING ET AL., supra 
note 13, at 141-42. 
